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Abstract
Since passage of the Personal Responsibility and Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 
states have the responsibility of developing and implementing their own Temporary 
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) programs to operate in tandem with the Federal Food 
Stamp Program (FSP). The context for this welfare reform included a booming economy and 
broad public perception that welfare programs severely reduce the work effort of recipients. 
This study focuses on a period when the economy was in recession and investigates how the 
old cash welfare program, AFDC, and the FSP affected labor supply (weekly hours of work) 
decisions for single mothers, the majority of welfare recipients, across the rural-urban 
continuum. The central question is how the labor supply of single mothers responded to the 
availability of AFDC and FSP benefits, respectively, and whether their responses differed 
depending upon whether they reside in rural or urban areas.
To answer this question, we utilize data from a special in-house Census Bureau extract from 
the Survey of Income and Program Participation with accurate rural and urban sub samples to 
estimate our three equations model, one for labor supply and one each for AFDC and FSP 
participation. The econometric model involves two linked components. The first is 
Bivariate Probit estimation of the AFDC and FSP participation decisions to account for 
possible correlation between the error terms of the participation equations. The participation 
estimates are linked to the second component, estimation of the labor supply equation, due to 
the endogeneity of the participation decisions and the possibility of bivariate selection.
Single mothers may and do choose participation in either or both AFDC and the FSP and 
unobserved characteristics associated with those participation choices are likely to be 
negatively correlated with unobserved factors affecting labor supply. The participation 
estimates are used to calculate bivariate sample selection correction factors added as 
auxiliary variables in the labor supply equation. Because wages play important roles in all 
three equations, yet are observed only for women who work, we first impute wages based 
upon Heckman’s two-step sample selection bias correction procedure for rural and urban sub 
samples. The results show that bivariate rather than univariate participation estimation is 
necessary. The bivariate selection corrections in the labor supply equations, however, yield 
mixed results. Nonetheless, the estimated model reasonably explains linkages between 
AFDC and FSP programs and labor supply.
The results show that increasing the AFDC tax on earnings by 10 percent generates almost 
identical average increases in labor supply by rural and urban single mothers, 0.12 and 0.11 
hours per week, respectively. Their responses are also similar with respect to a 10 percent 
increase in the FSP earnings tax, 0.03 and 0.04 hours per week on average. A 10 percent 
increase in AFDC and FSP unearned income tax rates yield average rural labor supply 
increases of 0.11 and 0.02 hours per week, respectively, and corresponding urban responses 
of 0.01 and -0.02 hours per week. With one exception, rural and urban single mothers 
reduce hours of work as expected when AFDC and FSP guaranteed benefits increase by 10 
percent. For the AFDC benefit increase, rural single mothers reduce labor supply less on 
average than do urban single mothers, -0.08 vs. -0.12 hours per week. The FSP benefit 
increase generates the largest reduction in labor supply, -0.35 hours per week for rural single 
mothers, compared to a labor supply increase of 0.14 hours per week by urban single 
mothers.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The welfare reform legislation, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
and Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), transformed federal social welfare policy. 
The Act eliminated the Federal guarantee of cash benefits to low income families with 
children by abolishing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement 
program. In its place, PRWORA transferred the responsibility for Temporary Assistance 
to Needy Families (TANF) design and implementation to each state, imposed significant 
new work requirements and 5-year lifetime limits on benefits, and established fixed block 
grants to states for operating these programs. The Act preserved the Federal commitment 
to food assistance through the Food Stamp Program (FSP), albeit with limitations on 
eligibility and reduced benefits. Thus, states had the difficult challenge of developing 
their own TANF cash assistance programs to operate in tandem with the Federal FSP. 
Now, some TANF recipients are hitting the 5-year limit and the economy is in recession.
Then, the context for states’ TANF program design decisions was one of fixed 
Federal block grants, which do not adjust as economic conditions change, and broad 
public perception that welfare programs severely reduce the work effort of recipients.
This study addresses whether that perception is correct by focusing on how the old cash 
welfare program, AFDC, and the FSP affected labor supply (hours of work) decisions of 
single mothers, the majority of welfare recipients. This study also accounts for how 
single mothers' decisions vary depending upon their households', and their residential 
areas' characteristics. The central question is how the labor supply of single mothers 
responds to the availability of AFDC and FSP benefits, respectively, and whether their 
responses differ depending on where they live along the rural-urban continuum.
This report is structured as follows: Section II details the source and unique 
characteristics of the data utilized herein and describes labor supply, program 
participation, and other characteristics of the rural, suburban and urban single mothers. 
Section III details the theoretical framework for explaining single mothers’ labor supply 
and program participation decisions based on the microeconomic theory of utility 
maximization. Section IV develops an econometric representation of the theoretical 
decision making framework. The model accounts for econometric problems associated 
with estimating the complex set of three interrelated choices facing each single mother, 
AFDC participation, FSP participation, and labor supply (hours of work). This section 
also reports and discusses the estimation results. A discussion of the policy implications 
of those results follows in Section V. The final section, VI, provides conclusions and 
implications for further research.
This study makes a number of unique contributions. Geographically-specific data 
from the Survey of Income and Program Participation are utilized. This geographic 
specificity is not available in the publicly released data. All discussion and analyses 
highlight differences and similarities between rural, suburban and urban single mothers 
and their households. Theoretical and econometric frameworks for understanding the 
determinants of single mothers’ AFDC and FSP program participation and labor supply 
decisions are built. The econometric model is estimated separately for rural, suburban
and urban single mothers. Finally, manipulation of the econometric results yields 
insights regarding how changing cash assistance and FSP policy parameters affect joint 
program participation and labor supply decisions of rural, suburban and urban single 
mothers. Together, these unique contributions can alert state policy makers to the need to 
consider how their single mothers array across the rural-urban continuum as they evaluate 
and perhaps redesign their own TANF cash assistance programs.
II. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS
A. Data
To accomplish the research objectives outlined above, we utilize the Census 
Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The survey is a multi­
panel longitudinal survey of persons 15 years or older. Data are also collected on all 
other persons who live with or move in with members of the original sample. One can 
obtain cross-sectional views of respondents at one point in time as well as longitudinal 
views of changes in economic circumstances and household composition over time. 
Furthermore, SIPP is the only nationally representative data available that contains all the 
appropriate sociodemographic data as well as exhaustive lists of income and assets 
information essential for determining means-tested transfer program eligibility. Earnings 
and self-employment information, including wages and hours of work from up to four 
jobs and self-employment activities are collected for all adults in the household.
Initially, it appeared that these data would be unusable because the public use 
version of SIPP does not allow accurate identification of a crucial piece of information, 
place of residence. Only a special metropolitan subsample is identified within the public 
use version. Non-metropolitan or rural households are identified only in the most 
populous states. In all other states, the true place of residence for rural households, in 
particular, is masked to preserve confidentiality. The Census Bureau graciously 
removed this barrier.
The Bureau made an in-house version of the first panel of SIPP, the 1984 Panel 
(initiated in October 1983) available. This version contains actual place of residence and 
other geographically linked information. The 1984 Panel of SIPP is a nationally 
representative sample of 19,878 households in the civilian non-institutionalized 
population. The adults in the sampled households were interviewed. Monthly economic 
and demographic information was collected over a three-year period. Until 1996, 
subsequent panels were initiated each calendar year and cover 28, 32 or 36 months with 
sample sizes varying from 12,500 to 23,500 (General Accounting Office). Each panel is 
divided into four sub-samples or rotation groups. Each group is interviewed in a separate 
month with a complete, cycle or wave, completed after four months. At every interview, 
questions are asked regarding each of the four months since the previous interview. 1
For this study, a cross-section from the fourth month of the third wave of the 1984 
Panel was chosen. That is, data for the month prior to the third wave interview were 
extracted. Depending on the rotation group, the data relate to the months of May, June,
1 For more information, see the SIPP Users Guide (1987).
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July or August 1984. At that time, 18,941 households were interviewed. Single mothers 
headed 1500 of the households. Of these, 644 single mothers resided in urban areas, 519 
resided in suburbs and 337 resided in rural areas.2 The labor supply and program 
participation decisions of these single mothers and other characteristics of these women 
and their households are presented in the next section.
Before proceeding, however, one potential data-related concern must be 
addressed. A reasonable person might ask, “How can data collected in 1984 inform 
today’s policy concerns?” A first, straightforward response is that these data provide 
unique information. At least two other analyses of single mothers’ AFDC and FSP 
participation and labor supply behavior have been done (Fraker and Moffit and Keane 
and Moffit). The former use data from an earlier year, 1980, and the later use the public- 
use form of the data analyzed herein. Neither study deals with the question of whether 
the behavior of single mothers differs along the rural-urban residential continuum. If 
such differences were present in 1984, there is no reason to believe that they would have 
vanished by today.
Second, the early to mid 1980s was a period of economic uncertainty with much 
higher unemployment. Then, AFDC and the FSP represented a known and relatively 
stable safety net policy with expanding or contracting caseloads and associated funding 
as economic conditions changed. By utilizing data from 1984, we are able to understand 
responses to cash and in-kind transfers when the programs delivering such transfers were 
relatively stable and the economic conditions were more uncertain.
In contrast, a study using more recent data from the latter 1990s would take place 
in an expanding economy with low unemployment and an associated reduction in the 
need for AFDC and FSP benefits. Given that this long economic expansion stalled, 
slowed and went into recession, what we learn about similarities in or differences 
between rural, suburban and urban single mothers’ program participation and labor 
supply decisions of 1984, remain relevant today.
B. Descriptive Analysis
This section describes poverty status, program participation, labor supply and 
other characteristics of the 1500 single mothers and their households studied herein. 
Along the way, speculations are made regarding how welfare reform may differentially 
affect rural, suburban and urban single mother households. All households headed by 
single mothers are included because most actual or potential welfare recipients reside in 
such households. They are at risk of poverty if not already poor.
2 Use of the terms, urban, suburban and rural are not precisely correct due to limitations of the data. The 
data indicate whether the household resides in a metropolitan or nonmetropolitan area. For metropolitan 
areas, the data also indicate whether the household resides in the central city or in the balance of the 
metropolitan area. For ease of exposition, ‘urban’ and ‘suburban’ refer to residence in and outside the 
central cities of metropolitan areas, respectively, and ‘rural’ refers to residence in nonmetropolitan areas.
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Poverty
How single mothers’ household incomes relate to the poverty line based upon 
residence is described in Figure 1. The household income measure used here is the 
official measure used for determining whether a household is in poverty. It includes cash 
transfers such as AFDC benefits but excludes in kind transfers such as food stamps. For 
a family of three, the poverty line was $8,277 in 1984 (1991 Green Book, p. 1134). Two 
striking phenomena stand out in the figure. First, suburban single mother households are 
much better off than their urban or rural counterparts. Seventy percent of suburban single 
mother households have incomes of more than twice the poverty line while only 51 and 
53 percent of urban and rural households, respectively, reach that relative income range. 
Second, the distributions of urban and rural single mother households near or below 
poverty differ substantially, where near poverty is defined as incomes that fall within 101 
to 150 percent of the poverty line. More than one third of urban single mother 
households are at or below the poverty line compared to a quarter of those in rural areas, 
while those in urban areas have lower near poverty rates (12 percent) compared to their 
rural counterparts (19 percent).
Program Participation
Program participation status of single mothers in urban, suburban and rural areas 
is described in Figure 2. At first glance, this figure seems remarkably similar to the 
previous figure. The two are similar in that virtually the same proportions of urban, 
suburban and rural households have no program participation (Figure 2) as the 
proportions who have incomes at or greater than 200 percent of the poverty line (Figure 
1). This is not surprising because AFDC is particularly targeted to households whose 
before-transfer incomes are at or below the poverty line and FSP benefits are targeted to 
those whose before-transfer incomes plus AFDC benefits are below 130 percent of the 
poverty line. Once AFDC benefits are added to Food Stamps and other income, total 
resources are unlikely to reach 200 percent of the poverty line.
The second figure does reveal some interesting differences and similarities in 
program participation, however. Regardless of where they live, only three percent of 
single mothers participate only in AFDC. Suburban single mothers’ overall program 
participation is much lower than their urban or rural counterparts. Just less than one-third 
of suburban single mothers participate in at least one program compared to close to one- 
half of urban and rural single mother households, respectively.
Although their overall participation is similar, urban and rural single mother 
households’ patterns of participation across programs are quite different. Urban 
households are more likely to participate in both programs and less likely to participate in 
only the FSP with 34 and 12 percent participation, respectively. Rural single mothers 
show a more balanced participation pattern with 24 percent participating in both 
programs and 19 percent participating only in the FSP.
Labor Supply
The labor supply of urban, suburban and rural single mothers is described in 
Figure 3. Labor supply is measured as the hours of work per week based upon the week 
before the interview and grouped into four categories: zero hours of work per week, 1 to
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30 hours per week, 31 to 40 hours per week and 41 or more hours per week. The second 
category, 1 to 30 hours, is wide because a more finely grained categorization included too 
few observations. Urban single mothers are least likely to be working and suburban 
single mothers are most likely to be working. Half of urban single mothers do not work, 
compared to 35 and 42 percent of suburban and rural single mothers, respectively. If 
single mothers are working, they usually work near or more than full time. Fifty-five 
percent of suburban single mothers do so, followed by half of rural single mothers and 43 
percent of urban single mothers. A small, but not unimportant group of single mothers 
work 41 hours a week or more, 7, 11 and 10 percent of urban, suburban and rural single 
mothers, respectively.
Participation and Labor Supply
To begin to address the central research question of how AFDC and FSP 
participation relate to single mothers’ labor supply decisions, the weekly hours of work 
data and the participation data underpinning Figures 2 and 3, respectively, are combined 
in Figure 4. Each three-bar cluster relates to one of the four labor supply categories from 
Figure 3. Generally, single mothers who work more hours per week are less likely to 
participate in either program, regardless of where they live. At the extremes, 79 to 82 
percent of nonworking single mothers participate in at least one program, compared to 7 
to 11 percent of those working more than full time. Working more than full time clearly 
does not guarantee lifting all those households out of actual or near poverty. If it did, 
none of these households would be eligible to receive AFDC or FSP benefits. It is 
important to keep in mind that roughly one quarter of single mothers who stay home do 
not need or do not apply for such benefits.
How program participation patterns change as hours of work change for each 
residential category can be garnered from Figure 4 by focusing on corresponding bars 
across clusters. Suburban single mothers have less total program participation than their 
urban and rural counterparts in the first three labor supply categories, dramatically so for 
those working 1 to 30 hours per week, and are close to last in the final category.
Working rural single mothers have a stronger reliance on overall program benefits than 
working urban single mothers for all three positive work categories.
Strong patterns also emerge when considering AFDC and the FSP separately. In 
every labor supply category and dramatically in the second category, relatively more 
rural single mothers and their families rely only on food stamps than those in urban or 
suburban areas. This suggests these rural households would be somewhat insulated from 
low state TANF cash assistance program benefits. In contrast, urban female single parent 
households are generally more reliant on AFDC than those who reside in suburbs or rural 
areas.
While AFDC participation generally declines with increases in labor supply for 
all single mother households, it does not vanish, even when the mother is working from 
31 hours per week to more than full time. This is of concern because their before-transfer 
incomes must be at or below the poverty line to receive AFDC benefits. If these working 
single mothers faced the prospect of welfare reform, they would fall further into poverty
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unless they were able to work more hours and/or receive higher wages. Likewise, absent 
appropriate job skills, employment opportunities and child care, nonworking single 
mother households would fare even worse given the wide variation in programs across 
states, strict work requirements and limits on the number of years of eligibility for cash 
benefits under welfare reform.
Other Characteristics and Statistical Significance
So far, this section has described program participation and labor supply decisions 
of the rural, suburban and urban single mothers in our sample as well as the poverty 
status of their households. Next, we explore other characteristics, which may help 
explain the observed differences in program and labor force participation. We also 
address whether differences we observe are statistically significant. Definitions and 
means for the characteristics or variables of interest and for potential explanatory 
variables are presented in Table 1, as are indicators of significant differences in those 
variables. (Calculated t-statistics for testing the statistical significance of differences 
between variable means are presented in Table A1 of the Appendix.)
First, consider differences in program participation, graphed in Figure 3. Table 1 
indicates that urban households are most likely to participate in AFDC (APART=0.37), 
followed by rural (0.27) and then by suburban (0.22) households. Each is significantly 
higher than the next. The same ordering applies to FSP participation (FPART), with 
urban, rural and suburban participation proportions of 0.46, 0.44 and 0.27, respectively. 
Urban and rural FSP participation, however, do not differ significantly.
Even though suburban single mother households are less likely to participate in 
AFDC, those who do participate receive higher benefits (AFDCBEN) than do 
participants residing elsewhere. Average AFDC benefits are $328.25, $350.17 and 
$248.03, for urban, suburban and rural participants, respectively. While average benefits 
of urban and suburban participants do not statistically differ, both are significantly higher 
than those of rural participants. This may arise because relatively more urbanized states 
tend to give more generous AFDC benefits than more rural states. In contrast, rural FSP 
recipients have significantly higher FSP benefits (FSBEN) than do urban or suburban 
recipients. Average Food Stamp benefits are $151.14, $137.60 and $168.97 for urban, 
suburban and rural participating households, respectively. In part, the significant 
differences between FSP benefits may be explained by the fact that the Food Stamp 
Program takes AFDC benefits into account when determining how many food stamps a 
household is eligible to receive per month. That is, when income, including AFDC, is 
lower, food stamp benefits are higher. Thus, the less generous AFDC benefits of very 
rural states would result in higher FSP benefits for those states’ residents, on average.
Momentarily setting aside labor supply decisions, which affect the level of 
income from earnings, program participation decisions may be affected by other 
household resources, such as unearned income and homeownership. Unearned income is 
defined as all cash income received from any source except AFDC and child support. 
Home ownership may represent home equity that could be drawn upon currently or in the 
future. Half of suburban single mothers are homeowners (TENURE), compared to
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Table 1: Variable Names, Definitions and Means by Residence
V a r ia b le  N a m e s
Continuous Variables
D e f in it io n s
Urban
(n=644)
Means
S u b u rb
(n=519)
R u ra l
(n=337)
AGE Mother's age 36.59 1** 37.85 37.09
ED Mother's education 11.30 1 11.79 2* 11.31
DISABLED =1 if mother is disabled, 0 otherwise 0.14 0.12 0.14
FAMSIZE Household size 3.58 1* 3.43 3.45
NADULTS Number of adults 1.55 1.54 1.50
KIDS05 Number of children aged birth to 5 0.65 1** 0.49 2* 0.61
KIDS610 Number of children aged 6 to 10 0.53 0.49 0.50
KIDS1117 Number of children aged 11 to 17 0.921 1.002 0.91
TENURE =1 if own the residence, 0 otherwise 0.27 1** 0.50 2* 0.42 3**
WDUM =1 if mother works, 0 otherwise 0.50 1** 0.64 2** 0.58 3**
TOTHRS Mother's work hours if working 38.22 38.58 37.91
WAGE Mother's wage if working 6.26 1 6.77 6.40
EARNED Household earned income 754.68 1 1000.55 2 738.73
UNEARNED Household unearned income 258.46 1** 486.26 2** 303.773
CHLDSUPT =1 if receive child support, 0 otherwise 0.17 1** 0.31 0.29 3**
CSUPTAMT Child support amount if received 239.11 1** 310.54 2** 198.97 3*
FPART =1 if FSP participant, 0 otherwise
C
D
O
0.27 2** 0.44
FSBEN Food stamp benefits if participate 151.14 1 137.60 2** 168.42 3*
APART =1 if participate in AFDC, 0 otherwise 0.37 1** 0.22 2* 0.27 3**
AFDCBEN AFDC benefit if participate 328.25 350.17 2** 248.03 3**
UNRATE State unemployment rate 7.45 1** 7.71 2** 8.14 3**
Categorical Variables
BLACK =1 if mother is Black, 0 otherwise 0.49 1 0.21 0.24 3*
ORACE =1 if mother is of another nonwhite race, 
0 otherwise (omitted category is White)
CMOO 0.04 2** 0.01
SEP =1 if mother is separated 0.25 1* 0.20 0.20 3*
DIV =1 if mother is divorced 0.34 1** 0.49 0.51 3*
NEVERMAR =1 if mother never married, 0 otherwise 
(omitted category is widowed)
0.27 1** 0.14 0.12 3*
SOUTH =1 if reside in the South, 0 otherwise 0.35 1 0.31 2** 0.45 3*
MIDWEST =1 if reside in the Midwest, 0 otherwise 0.27 0.24 0.28
NOREAST =1 if reside in the Northeast, 0 otherwise 0.22 0.23 2** 0.13 3*
(omitted category is West)
T he urban mean is significantly smaller (larger) than the suburban mean is at a = 0.10, one-tailed.
2The suburban mean is significantly smaller (larger) than the rural mean at a = 0.10, one-tailed. 
3The rural mean is significantly smaller (larger) than the urban mean at a =0.10,one-tailed 
* a =0.05 **a =0.01
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1984 Panel, Third Wave
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slightly over two-fifths of rural and one-quarter of urban single mothers. Each proportion 
is significantly greater than the next. Suburban households also have significantly higher 
average unearned income (UNEARNED = $486.26) than their rural ($303.77) and urban 
($258.46) counterparts.
One other household resource, child support, may be partially related to the 
mother’s marital status. Child support awards are most likely to be in place for divorced 
mothers, next likely for separated mothers and least likely for single mothers who never 
married. While the proportions of suburban (CHLDSUPT = 0.31) and rural (0.29) 
households receiving child support are statistically indistinguishable, they are each 
significantly higher than that of urban households (0.17). Suburban and rural single 
mothers also have statistically identical marital status distributions. Approximately half 
of them are divorced (DIV), a fifth are separated (SEP) and a seventh or eighth never 
married (NEVERMAR). The marital status distribution of urban single mothers stands in 
stark contrast, with only a third divorced, a quarter separated and just over a quarter that 
never married. Given that urban single mothers are less likely to be divorced and more 
than twice as likely to have never married, it is not surprising that they are approximately 
half as likely to receive child support as their rural and suburban counterparts.
Even though they are least likely to be child support recipients, urban single 
mothers are in the middle in terms of amount of child support received. Rural child 
support recipients get the least (CSUPTAMT = $198.97), on average. Urban recipients 
get significantly more ($239.11) and suburban recipients get significantly more still, 
$310.54 per month, one average. Adding child support amounts to other unearned 
income and homeownership, it is clear that suburban households have substantially 
higher resources available to them than do their urban and rural counterparts, on average. 
Even without considering labor market factors, this may provide at least a partial 
explanation for why suburban households have significantly lower rates of AFDC and 
FSP participation.
Other candidates for explaining program and labor force participation decisions 
include labor market factors, such as skill levels of potential employees, wages they can 
earn and the availability of employment opportunities. One measure of the relative 
availability of employment opportunities, state unemployment rates (UNRATE), differ 
significantly across residential categories, as indicated in Table 1. The state 
unemployment rates are highest for rural households (8.14 percent) and lowest for urban 
households (7.45 percent), much higher than we generally experience today.
Interestingly, even though urban single mothers face a stronger labor market (lower 
unemployment rate), they are significantly less likely to work (WDUM = 0.50) than 
suburban (0.64) and rural (0.58) single mothers cohorts.
Age and education are often used as indicators of human capital or labor market 
skills. The average age (AGE) and years of education (ED) of single mothers are of 
similar magnitudes across the three residential categories as depicted in Table 1. 
Nonetheless, urban single mothers are significantly younger (AGE = 36.59) than their 
suburban counterparts (37.85), insignificantly so compared to rural single mothers
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(37.09), on average. With respect to educational attainment, rural and urban single 
mothers also have virtually identical average years of schooling (ED), 11.31 and 11.30, 
respectively. Suburban single mothers’ average education (11.79) is slightly but 
significantly higher than the educational attainment of other single mothers. If these 
variables are associated with labor market skills, suburban single mothers may have an 
advantage in the labor market. That is, they may be more successful in obtaining jobs 
and/or garnering higher wages, on average. This could help explain why suburban single 
mothers are significantly more likely to be in the labor force (WDUM) and why, when 
they work, their wages (WAGE) are slightly higher (though not significantly so) than 
other working single mothers.
It is interesting to note that average hours worked (TOTHOURS) and average 
wages earned (WAGE) by working single mothers do not differ significantly across 
residential categories, with the exception of slightly but significantly lower wages for 
urban workers. That is, working single mothers generally work close to full time and 
receive wages between $6.26 and $6.77 per hour, on average, regardless of where they 
live. If all suburban single mothers worked their average number of hours per week and 
could earn their average workers’ wage throughout the year, they would earn $13,582, 
which is 167 percent above the poverty line for a family of three. Similarly, urban and 
rural single mothers would earn $12,441 and $12,616 annually and reach 150 and 152 
percent of the poverty line, respectively. Because suburban single mothers are more 
likely to work, suburban average total household earnings (EARNED = $1,000.55) are 
significantly higher than those of either urban ($754.68) or rural ($728.73) single 
mothers. Note that in all cases, total household average earnings (EARNED) are lower 
than the hypothetical cases because they include zero earnings for those who do not 
work.
Differences in labor force and program participation may also be explained by a 
set of household structure characteristics. The set includes household size (FAMSIZE), 
number of adults (NADULTS) and numbers of children in three age categories: from 
birth to age five (KIDS05), age six through 10 (KIDS610) and age eleven through 17 
(KIDS1117). Although this set reveals quite similar household structures across 
residential categories, there are some significant differences. Urban households are 
larger than other households, significantly so when compared to suburban households. 
They also tend to have younger children. Urban and rural households do not differ in this 
regard. Specifically, urban single mother households have significantly more preschool 
children and significantly fewer children in the oldest age category than do suburban 
households. In turn, suburban households have significantly fewer preschool children 
and significantly more of the oldest children than do rural households.
Family structure differences could contribute to the lower (higher) labor force 
participation and associated higher (lower) program participation that we observe for 
urban (suburban) single mothers. With more preschool children and fewer of the oldest 
children, urban single mothers would have less day care assistance from older siblings 
and higher work-related day care expenses than suburban households would, were they to 
work. This would make safety net programs such as AFDC and the FSP relatively more
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attractive to urban single mothers. This logical argument, however, does not explain the 
pattern we observe for rural households. Compared to urban single mothers, they have 
significantly higher labor force participation, yet similar overall program participation. 
Some other factors must be in play for rural single mothers and their households. 
Nonetheless, the advent of welfare reform, with limits on the duration of cash benefits 
from state TANF programs, means that the availability of safe, affordable child care is 
crucial for all single mothers to become gainfully employed. The need for such child care 
is especially pressing for urban single mothers and their children.
Two other sets of characteristics reported in Table 1, region and race, are more 
difficult to interpret in terms of possible effects on single mothers’ labor force and 
program participation decisions. With respect to the latter, rural residents in the sample 
are significantly more likely to be found in the South (South = 0.45) and significantly less 
likely to be found in the Northeast (NOREAST = 0.13) than other single mother 
households. The sample’s urban single mother households are also more likely to reside 
in the South (0.35) than any other region of the country. The heavily southern orientation 
of rural households, and to a lesser extent, urban households, raises a concern related to 
one mentioned earlier. Because Southern states have been more likely to give very low 
AFDC benefits, we might expect those states to have low TANF benefits and place the 
strictest limits on the duration of benefits than elsewhere in the country. A countervailing 
factor may be that the South is growing relatively fast with associated growth in job 
opportunities. Questions remain, however, as to whether this growth reaches the rural 
South, in particular, and whether rural and urban single mothers have job skills and 
available child care to allow them to take part in their growing economy. Thus, the 
implications of welfare reform for Southern single mothers, especially those in rural 
areas, is unclear.
With respect to race, Table 1 shows that urban single mothers stand out 
dramatically from those who reside elsewhere. Almost half of urban single mothers are 
Black compared to just over a fifth and just under a quarter of suburban and rural single 
mothers, respectively. The suburban and rural proportions of Blacks are not significantly 
different. Both, however, are significantly lower than the proportion for urban areas. If 
there is a Black urban underclass (Wilson), these single mothers may be the most welfare 
dependent and, therefore, face the most difficulties under welfare reform. The same 
result will occur if there is racial discrimination in the quality of educational 
opportunities or in hiring decisions.
C. Summary
This section first discussed the source of data for this study, a cross section from 
the 1984 SIPP Panel. It then described how and sought explanations for why urban, 
suburban and rural single mothers’ program and labor force participation decisions differ. 
The analysis revealed how a number of characteristics of single mothers and their 
households differ depending upon where they live. The analysis also permitted some 
speculation about how they might fare under welfare reform. In so doing, some clear 
patterns emerged.
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Urban households are most and suburban households are least likely to be in 
poverty and to participate in AFDC and the FSP. Not unexpectedly, the opposite pattern 
exists for labor force participation, with urban households least and suburban households 
most likely to be working. Together, these patterns may be explained by a combination 
of other characteristics. Urban single mothers are the youngest and least educated, most 
likely to have never married or to be separated and least likely to be divorced. Their 
households are least likely to have access to resources other than earnings or program 
benefits such as, child support awards and amounts, other unearned income and home 
equity. Urban households are also the largest with the highest numbers of preschool 
children and tie for last in terms of the number in the oldest children category. For all 
these characteristics, the situation for suburban households is exactly the opposite, with 
rural households falling in between.
Rural single mothers’ labor force and program participation patterns are more 
difficult to disentangle. Even though they face the worst labor market conditions 
(unemployment rates) and have relatively young children, rural single mothers have the 
second highest labor force attachment. Despite their propensity to work, rural households 
tie with urban households for highest overall program participation. Further, when they 
work, rural single mothers have the highest overall program participation and rely most 
heavily on FSP benefits and least on AFDC benefits than working single mothers 
residing elsewhere, even when they work more than full time. The latter may be 
explained by their predominant location in the South. The former, higher overall 
program participation by working rural single mothers, is more difficult to understand.
Understanding what role all these characteristics play in determining program 
participation and labor supply decisions of urban, suburban and rural single parents 
requires results from multivariate analysis rather than the univariate analyses in this 
section. The multivariate econometric analyses are described, reported and discussed in 
section IV. First, the theoretical framework that underpins the econometric model is 
developed in the following section.
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
The microeconomic theory of utility maximization provides the foundation for 
this study of single mothers’ labor supply and program participation decisions.
Beginning with a simple model of labor supply, assume no cash or in-kind transfer 
programs such as AFDC or the FSP. Next, the possibility of AFDC participation and 
benefits are added. Then, replace AFDC with the possibility of FSP participation and 
benefits alone. Finally, we address the actual situation single mothers’ face, the 
possibility of participating in either or both programs as well as the labor force. In each 
case, from the simplest to the most complex, the focus is on how single mothers’ budget 
constraints and, in turn, labor supply decisions may be affected by the absence or 
presence of AFDC and/or FSP options. Section IV concludes by highlighting what this 
theoretical framework implies for the structure of the multivariate econometric analysis.
In the absence of any transfer programs, the usual model of labor supply is based 
on maximizing utility, U(Y, H), subject to the budget constraint, Y = wH + N, where, Y,
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w and H are total income, the wage rate and hours of work, respectively. N is nonwage 
or unearned income, including child support. Income and hours of work are assumed to 
affect utility positively and negatively, respectively. The budget constraint for a 
representative single mother is line AB with slope -w  in Figure 5 (replicated from Fraker 
and Moffitt, p. 29). The vertical distance from zero hours of work to point A reflects her 
unearned income (N). Under utility maximization, the mother chooses an hours/income 
combination from among those on AB. If wages or unearned income change, the budget 
constraint changes and her utility maximizing choice would likely change. Thus, wages 
and unearned income are the arguments of the labor supply function,
(1) H = f(w, N).
With no transfer program options, as in (1), the effect of unearned income on hours of 
work is negative if leisure is a normal good.
Following Graham and Beller’s framework, now add the possibility of 
participation in AFDC. The somewhat complex AFDC benefit structure is described in 
detail in Appendix B. For ease of exposition, define program benefits more simply as
(2) Ba = Ga - tAwH - rAN.
In (2), GA is the guaranteed benefit if the household has no other income and tA and rA are 
the AFDC tax rates on earnings and unearned income, respectively. From (2), define
(3) G'a = Ga - rAN
as the benefit she would receive if she did not work.
Given AFDC, our representative mother’s budget constraint is KLB in Figure 5. 
The vertical distance from zero hours to point K is N + G'A. The slope of the budget 
constraint between points K and L, -w(1 - tA), is flatter than between L and B (-w), 
because the AFDC program reduces benefits when earnings increase from zero up to 
point L. That point is often referred to as the break-even point, where the mother’s 
earnings are exactly high enough to reduce her potential AFDC benefits to zero.
As was the case in (1), budget constraint elements are arguments of the labor 
supply function when AFDC participation and benefits are possible. Because the mother 
also chooses whether to participate in AFDC, the labor supply function differs from (1) 
as follows:
(4) H = f(w(1 - tAPA), N + G'aPa).
PA equals 1 if the mother chooses to participate in AFDC and equals 0 if she does not.
The first term of (4), is the net wage associated with earnings. That is, if the mother 
doesn’t participate in AFDC (PA=0), her net wage is the market wage, w .3 If she
3 Here we ignore additional complications associated with the income tax system.
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participates (Pa= 1), her net wage, w(1-tA), is less than the market wage due to the 
program’s indirect tax rate on earnings, tA. The second term of (4) indicates that her 
labor supply decision is affected by her unearned income (N) if she doesn’t participate in 
AFDC or that plus her potential maximum benefit (N + G'a) if  she does participate.
AFDC participation is endogenous and depends on whether the household would 
maximize utility on or off the program. By substituting (4) into the utility function, the 
resulting indirect utility function (V), can be used to describe the AFDC participation 
decision as follows:
(5) Pa* = V(w( 1 - tA), N + Ga') - V(w, N) and
(6) Pa = 1 if Pa* > 0 or 
Pa = 0 if Pa* < 0.
That is, if  indirect utility is greater on the program V(w(1 - tA), N + Ga') than off the 
program V(w, N), Pa* is greater than zero and household participates in AFDC.
Now, replace AFDC with the possibility of FSP participation and benefits. As 
shown in detail in Appendix C, the FSP benefit calculation is quite complex. A more 
straightforward version is
(7) Bf = Gf - rF(l - eF)wH - rF(N - Df - Sf).
Here, GF is the guaranteed FSP benefit for a household with no other resources, rF is the 
FSP tax applied to both earned and unearned income and eF is the earned income 
disregard. The disregard serves to protect portion eF of earnings from the FSP tax. In the 
last term of (7), DF and SF are the standard and shelter deductions, respectively. The 
deduction for shelter expenses assists households with high rental expenses relative to 
their incomes. Much simplified in (7), the actual shelter deduction is capped, declines 
with income at rate tS, and phases out when income is sufficiently high. Although not 
shown in (7), the program also provides a minimum benefit for one- and two-person 
households, who just barely meet the income eligibility criteria, even though (7) would 
yield a benefit below that minimum. More detailed specifications o f the minimum 
benefit and shelter deduction can be found in Appendix C.
Substituting tF for rF(l - eF) in (7) yields,
(8) Bf = Gf - tFwH - rF(N - Df - Sf)
and the FSP guaranteed benefit at zero hours of work is
(9) G'f = Gf - rF(N - Df - Sf).
Equations (8) and (9) are similar in form to their AFDC counterparts, (2) and (3), 
respectively. Although the formulae appear very similar, our representative single 
mother’s AFDC and FSP budget constraints are strikingly different. Her actual food
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stamp constraint, CDEFGIJB in Figure 5, has a series of kinks and a notch (Fraker and 
Moffit, p.28). The vertical distance from zero hours to C is N + G'F. The kinks and 
segments with different slopes arise from specifics of the benefit structure, as follows:
(1) For the first segment, between C and D, the standard deduction applies and earnings 
are not taxed. The slope of this segment is, therefore, -w. (2) At D, the standard 
deduction is exhausted and the earnings tax applies up to point E. This segment’s slope is 
-w(1 - tF). (3) Between points E and F the shelter deduction is phased out at rate tS to 
yield an even flatter slope for this segment, -w(1 - tF)(1 + tS). (4) For the segment from F 
to G, the mother’s constraint again reflects only the earnings tax with slope -w(1 - tF). (5) 
All along the final segment, from point G to I, her household is only eligible for the 
minimum benefit. Hence, her earnings are not taxed and the slope of the segment is -w. 
The notch at I is generated because her household is no longer eligible even for the 
minimum food stamp benefit.
As was the case for AFDC in (4), the food stamp budget constraint elements are 
arguments of the labor supply function when FSP participation and benefits are possible, 
such that
(10) H = f(w(1 - tFPF), N + G'fPf ).4
In (10) the endogenous variable PF indicates FSP participation, the first argument 
represents net wages and the second, available resources at zero hours of work. Defined 
in parallel to the AFDC participation decision framework (5) and (6), the FSP decision 
framework is:
(11) Pf* = V(w(1 - tF), N + G'f) - V(w, N) and
(12) PF = 1 if Pf* > 0 or 
Pf = 0 if Pf* < 0.
The single mother participates in the FSP if the indirect utility she would attain on the 
program is greater than her indirect utility off the program.
We now have the building blocks for our situation, where households may 
participate in AFDC and/or the FSP. As one might expect, the model is quite complex. 
A major complication is that AFDC benefits are included as unearned income for the 
purpose of calculating FSP benefits. AFDC benefits, however, are not affected by the 
FSP. Therefore, only the benefit formula for the FSP in (8) is modified as follows:
(13) Bf = Gf - tFwH - rF(N - Df - Sf + Ba).
At zero hours of work, the food stamp guarantee is:
4 The careful reader will note that the first argument of the labor supply function, net wage, actually is more 
complicated over a range where the shelter deduction is phased out (w(1 - tF)(1 + t S)). The data do not 
include rental expense, so each household’s relevant phase-out income range was impossible to determine. 
Therefore, the shelter deduction is assumed fixed at the maximum here and throughout the econometric 
analysis. For households with actual, though unobserved, low rent to income ratios, calculated FSP 
benefits will be somewhat higher than the program would provide.
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(14) G"f = Gf - tf(N - Df - Sf + G'a).
From (9), (14) can be rewritten as:
(15) G"f = G'f - rFG'A.
The budget constraint, when participation and benefits from AFDC and the FSP 
are possible, also has kinks and a notch. A constraint for our representative single mother 
may look like MHIJB in Figure 5. The constraint indicated is suggestive only because 
exact kink locations depend upon complex linkages between the programs. We know, 
however, that the combination of programs yields at least one more kink (Fraker and 
Moffitt, p. 29) and that some of the segment slopes differ from those for either program 
alone. As can be seen clearly in (15) the food stamp tax, rF, is applied directly to AFDC 
benefits at zero hours of work. The vertical distance from zero hours of work to M is N + 
G'a + G"f . At M and beyond, food stamp benefits are lower than they would be if AFDC 
benefits were not available. While AFDC benefits are not changed by the presence of the 
FSP, the effect of AFDC’s tax rates are modified by rF through (13) to (2).
Two general aspects of the joint AFDC and FSP constraint merit comment. First, 
along the portion from M  to H, benefits from both programs are available to our single 
mother. Second, as her earnings increase beyond H and up to the notch at IJ, only food 
stamps are available. The food-stamp-only segment arises because AFDC eligibility 
ceases when income is higher than 100 percent of the poverty line and FSP benefits 
generally continue up to 130 percent of the poverty line.
Using (3) and (15), the labor supply function that incorporates the possibilities of 
AFDC and FSP participation is
(16) H = f(w(1 - tAPA - tFPF), N + G'aPa + G"fPf).
As in (4) and (10), (16) includes participation indicators and is also a function of net 
wages and available resources (unearned plus program benefits) at zero hours of work. 
Equation (16) is the general case of the three other hours equations derived above. If the 
household participates in neither program (PA = PF = 0), participates only in AFDC (PA =
1 and PF = 0) or participates only in the FSP (PA = 0 and PF = 1), (16) yields (1), (4) or 
(10), respectively. In this labor supply function, (16), w, tA, tF, N, G'a, G'f, and rF are 
exogenous, but PA and PF are not.
Using (5), (11) and (15), the two endogenous program participation decisions 
together require single mothers to compare four indirect utility possibilities:
(17a) V(w(1 - tA - tF), N + G'a + G''f)
for participation in both programs;
(17b) V(w(1 - tF), N + G'f)
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for participation in the FSP only;
(17c) V(w(1 - tA), N + Ga ') 
for participation in AFDC only and 
(17d) V(w, N) 
for no program participation.
They choose the participation combination that allows them to attain the highest indirect 
utility.
Unlike the usual, simple model of utility maximization, where the individual 
chooses one hour/income combination from those on one budget constraint, our single 
mothers’ choose one work hours/income combination from those on four  budget 
constraints. As we observed in the descriptive section, there are households that 
participate only in AFDC although they are categorically eligible for food stamps. 
Likewise, there are households that participate only in the FSP even though some of them 
are also eligible for AFDC. Finally, some households participate in neither program even 
though they are eligible for both. That is, some mothers choose an hours/income point 
from K to just before L on the AFDC alone constraint, from C to just before H on the 
food stamp alone constraint, or from A to L on the no program constraint in Figure 5. 
They make these choices even though their households would have more total resources 
if they participated in both programs.
At first glance, this seems nonsensical to most economists. They would argue, at 
least initially, that MHIJB in Figure 5 is the only appropriate constraint because it 
includes benefits from both programs and yields the highest level of total resources.
There are several possible (economic) explanations for the observed phenomena, 
nonparticipation of eligible households. One is stigma associated with welfare program 
participation (Moffitt (1983), Ranney and Kushman, and Fraker and Moffitt). That is, 
mothers may not like receiving or having others know they receive welfare benefits. For 
example, during the time frame of our study, 1984, food stamp recipients could not hide 
their recipiency status from anyone in the grocery store check-out line as they ripped 
stamps out of their coupon books to pay for their food. This source of stigma for food 
stamp recipients should be greatly reduced or eliminated by the advent of electronic 
benefits transfer (EBT), mandated and soon to be in place nationwide. With nation-wide 
EBT, all food stamp households will receive a debit card that is credited with their food 
“stamp” allotment periodically. That card, rather than stamps, will be used for food 
purchases in stores.
Other reasons for nonparticipation include, lack of knowledge regarding 
eligibility or other program regulations, incorrect denial of eligibility by welfare offices 
and transactions costs associated with obtaining and subsequently re-certifying eligibility.
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To account for stigma, transactions cost and other unobserved or unobservable 
factors affecting participation, we follow Fraker and Moffitt and define f  A and f  F as 
capturing these factors and modify (5) and (11) accordingly, to build the two-program 
participation framework.
(18) PA* = V(w(1 - tA), N + Ga ') - V(w, N) - f  A and
(19) PF* = V(w(1 - tF), N + G'f) - V(w, N) - f  F, where 
Pa  = 1 if Pa * > 0 or Pa  = 0 if Pa * < 0 and
Pf  = 1 if Pf * > 0 or Pf  = 0 if Pf * < 0.
If f  A or f  F is large, a larger utility gain from that program will be required for the mother 
to choose to participate. Together, (18) and (19) reflect the four participation 
possibilities: participation in one program, the other program, both programs and neither 
program.
These participation functions and the labor supply function, (16), constitute the 
microeconomic framework for program participation and labor supply decisions of single 
mothers. That framework reveals the following: Labor supply decisions depend on 
endogenous program participation decisions, net wages (market wages or less, depending 
upon whether program tax rates apply), and total unearned resources (unearned income 
plus total applicable program benefits defined at zero hours of work). The latter two, net 
wages and total unearned resources also play a role in AFDC and FSP program 
participation decisions. After accounting for possible unobserved stigma, transaction 
costs, or other unobserved factors, program participation depends upon comparisons of 
utility gains on and off the programs. To the extent possible, key aspects of this 
theoretical framework will be incorporated directly into the multivariate econometric 
model developed next.
IV. ECONOMETRIC MODEL
A. Introduction
The endogeneity of the program participation decisions and two other 
econometric problems must be addressed before achieving the primary objective of 
accurately estimating the determinants of female single parents’ hours of work given the 
availability of AFDC and FSP participation and benefits. The second econometric 
problem relates to possible correlation between the error terms of the participation 
decisions. The third is that, wages, a necessary variable in the participation and hours 
equations, are not observed for women who are not working. Solutions to those 
problems, empirical specifications and estimation results follow a brief review of three 
prior studies that guide development of our econometric model.
Time and money costs associated with travelling to and from the welfare office, filling
out forms, obtaining proper documentation and dealing with welfare office staff are all
transactions costs.
22
B. Literature Review
The three guiding studies, one by Fraker and Moffitt (F and M), one by Keane 
and Moffitt (K and M) and the other by Graham and Beller (G and B), have been referred 
to in previous sections. Each merits further discussion here, because each addresses how 
two endogenous participation or participation-like decisions affect labor supply of single 
mothers in the U.S. F and M and K and M address the relationship between endogenous 
FSP and AFDC program participation decisions and labor supply. Both papers jointly 
estimate a highly complex three-equation model with bivariate selection. The bivariate 
selection aspect arises because eligible household may and do choose nonparticipation in 
either or both AFDC and the FSP and because unobserved characteristics associated with 
those participation choices are likely to be negatively correlated with unobserved factors 
affecting labor supply. F and M estimate reduced form equations using data from 1980.
K and M do structural modeling with simulation estimation methods using the 1984 SIPP 
Panel. To make their models more tractable, F and M and K and M categorize hours of 
work into three discrete categories: zero hours, part-time and full-time work.
Graham and Beller estimate a continuous hours of work function, with 
endogenous AFDC participation and child support receipt. Like F and M and K and M, 
they account for possible bivariate selection and correlations between the AFDC and 
child support receipt equations, respectively, and hours of work. However, they do so 
quite differently. They extend sample selection correction procedures to the bivariate 
selection case where labor supply is observed for all, not just the “selected” sample. 
Because their approach is much more tractable than F and M ’s and K and M's and 
because it allows estimation of a continuous labor supply function, rather than labor 
supply categories, G and B ’s approach is extended for the analysis herein.
C. Predicting Wages
Because wages play such important roles in the hours of work and program 
participation decisions, we impute wages (WHAT) for our single mothers based upon the 
wages earned by working single mothers. We do so by applying Heckman’s (1979) two- 
step sample selection bias correction procedure to each rural, suburban and urban 
subsample.
The first step is to utilize all observations in the subsample to estimate a probit 
equation for whether a wage is observed. The dependent variable equals one if wages are 
observed and zero if not. The probit estimates are used to calculate the inverse of the 
Mill’s ratio (LAMBDA) for each observation. Those calculated LAMBDAS are included 
as an auxiliary independent variable in the second step ordinary least squares wage 
regression using only subsample observations where wages are observed.
The LAMBDAS are necessary to correct for possible bias associated with 
unobserved characteristics that systematically affect the probability of observing a wage 
and the value of the wage. In other words, the error terms of the two equations may be 
correlated. The two-step Heckman procedure model results are presented in Appendix D 
in tables D1, D2 and D3 for the rural, suburban and urban subsamples, respectively. As 
shown in those tables, all three LAMBDA coefficients are negative, significantly so for 
the rural subsample, indicating a negative correlation between unobserved factors in the
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two equations. The LAMBDAS also correct for possible selection bias in the other 
coefficients of the wage equation. We use the (unbiased) coefficients from the second 
step wage equations (excluding LAMBDAS) presented in those appendix tables to 
impute wages for all single mothers in respective subsample.
It should be noted that Fraker and Moffitt criticize the use of this two-step 
Heckman technique for predicting wages on two grounds. First, they argue that the 
procedure will not yield consistent model estimates whenever the predicted values appear 
in the main (hours) equation nonlinearly, as is the case in their model. This is not a 
problem in our case because wages do appear linearly in our hours equation, as will be 
seen shortly. Second, F and M and K and M argue as have Moffitt (1984) and others, 
that wages are a function of hours of work, specifically, part-time wages are generally 
lower than full-time wages. This implies that the no-program budget constraint, AB in 
Figure 5, doesn’t have a constant slope (-w) as depicted. Their method of handling this 
problem, limiting themselves to three labor supply categories, is unsatisfactory if one is 
interested in a continuous range of labor supply possibilities. Furthermore, the correction 
they use, based on Wales and Woodland, requires the undesirable restriction of 
independence between the error terms of the wage and structural labor supply functions. 
Therefore, we estimate and then predict wages for all single mothers as do G and B, 
utilizing the Heckman procedure described above and the specification and estimates in 
Appendix D that do not include hours as an explanatory variable.5
D. Program Participation Equations
Following Graham and Beller’s modeling approach, we linearize the theoretical 
representations of AFDC participation (18) and FSP participation (19) around wages and 
nonwage income, including potential program benefits. This yields our empirical 
specifications for participation in the two programs PA and PF :
(20) PA = a0 + a jXA + a2N  + a3 G ’A + a4(-wtA) + eA and
(21) P f = bo + biXF + b2N  + b3GF + b4 (-wtp)  + eF,
In (20) and (21), XA and XF are vectors of demographic variables; N is unearned 
income including child support; G ’A and G ’F are household AFDC and FSP benefits at 
zero hours of work, respectively; -wtA and -wtF are the differences between wages on and 
off AFDC and the FSP,6 respectively; a ’s and b ’s are coefficients, and eA and eF are 
normally distributed error terms.
If the error terms of (20) and (21) are uncorrelated, these equations can be 
estimated with separate maximum likelihood probits. That is unlikely, however, because 
we have subsumed unobserved stigma, transactions costs and other factors associated 
with AFDC and FSP participation into those error terms. The correlation between eA and
5 It is also interesting to note that K and M design a two-step procedure which estimates the wage equation 
in the first stage and uses estimated wages in the second stage simulated moments (MSM) estimation of the 
choices.
6 The careful reader will note here that by linearizing (18) and (19), which are differences in indirect utility 
from being on and off AFDC, and food stamps respectively, our "wage terms" shift from (1-tA) and w to the 
difference between them. That is, w(1-A ta)-w  becomes -wta . The logic from -wtF follows directly.
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eF is likely to be positive, significantly so, as Fraker and Moffitt found. Thus, joint 
estimation of the participation equations utilizing the bivariate probit model, which 
allows for correlation between the error terms, is appropriate for our analysis.
E. Hours Equation
While the participation decisions are of interest on their own, they also need to be 
estimated to correct for their endogeneity in the hours model. As the first step toward 
specifying the empirical hours equation and the endogeneity correction, we draw from its 
theoretical counterpart (16) replicated below,
(16) H  = f(w(1 - IaPa - ipPp), N  + G'aPa + G"fPf) .
The first argument of (16) is an exogenous variable, net wage: Take home wages after 
program taxes on earnings (tA and tF) have been applied to gross wages. The second 
argument, though apparently simple, is complex. Recall from (3) that G'a is a function of 
Ga, N, and rA while G"f, from (14), is a function of exogenous variables including 
program guarantees (Ga , Gf) unearned income (N), and program taxes on unearned 
income (rA, r F). Following the derivation of the single-program hours functions, (3) and 
(10), (16) translates into an empirical hours function:
(22a) H  = co + C1X11 + C2 w(1 - A a - tFPf)  + cz(N + G'a - G"fPf )  + u ,7
where, c ’s are parameters; XH is a vector of demographic variables; the remaining 
variables are as specified in (16); and u is a normally distributed error term To make the 
structural interactions between the two programs clear, rewrite (22a) as
(22b) H  = Co + CiX h + C2 w(1 - tAPA - tFPF)  + C3N  + C^G'aPa +
c5(G 'f - rpG'APA ) P f + u .
Given (22a), (22b) implies C3 = C4 = C5 . This hypothesis can be viewed as a test of 
whether these program interactions are important in the labor supply decisions of single 
mothers. This revision also highlights the importance of the endogenous participation 
decisions. Now, if PA and P f were exogenous; estimation of (22b) would be 
straightforward.
Given their endogeneity, direct estimation of (22b) would generate biased results 
unless E(u\eA)  = 0 and E(u\eF)  = 0. That is, unless the covariances (or correlations) 
between the respective error terms are zero. That is unlikely. Unobserved factors that 
affect hours of work also are likely to affect AFDC and FSP participation, respectively.
7 Recall from (20) and (21) that N  is defined to include child support. Graham and Beller make a 
convincing theoretical and empirical case for the endogeneity of child support receipt in the hours equation. 
Even so, given our focus here on the role of AFDC and the FSP on work hours, we do not attempt to 
account for this additional source of endogeneity for fear of the model becoming too cumbersome, 
intractable and difficult to estimate.
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Graham and Beller, with their similar case where hours of work are a function of 
two endogenous choices (possibly correlated selection rules), extend the procedure of 
Barnow, Cain and Goldberger to obtain consistent estimates for the hours equation. 
Applying Graham and Beller’s procedure (pp. 679-680), the first step involves bivariate 
probit estimation of the participation equations, (20) and (21) above, and using the 
coefficient (a and b ) and error term correlation (r h o )  estimates to calculate:
(23) 1AA = zAf z Aa X A) p [ ( z p bX p  -  r h o *  ZA aX A )/sqr(1-rho2) ] /G ( . . ) 8 and
(24) App = z p j( z p b X p )F [ (z AaXA -  r h o *  zp b X p )/sq r(1 -rh o 2)] /G ( . .) ,
where zA = (2PA-  1), zp  = (2 P p -  1), r h o *  = zAzprho , f  is the univariate standard 
normal density, p  is the univariate standard normal cumulative distribution, and G  is the 
bivariate cumulative distribution, evaluated at (zAa X A, zp b X p)  given rho . Note that these 
calculated values have double subscripts to indicate their calculation from bivariate probit 
estimates. If r h o  = 0, these revert to the usual sample selection correction factors derived 
from single probit estimates, and would be subscripted with single rather than double 
values.
As expected, Fraker and Moffitt and Keane and Moffitt found significant negative
correlations between hours and FSP participation and between hours and AFDC
participation error terms.
The second step involves adding the values calculated in the first step to the hours 
equation as explanatory variables. Thus, the equation to be estimated is:
(25) H  = Co + C1X  + C2 w (1  -  tpPA -  tpP p) + C3N  + C4 G 'aPa
+ C s(G 'p -  rpG A P A  ) P p  + a 6 ?AA + a y lp p  + u,
This equation corrects for the endogeneity of the participation decisions (selection rules).
F. Estimation Results
Given nine estimated equations (two participation equations and one hours 
equation for single mothers residing in each of three areas, rural, suburban and urban), 
presentation and discussion of the results are organized as follows: (1) Details of 
estimation results for each area, including variable means, are presented in Appendix E. 
(2) All nine equations are summarized in Table 2. (3) Utilizing the results in Table 2, we 
discuss program participation first, followed by hours of work. In both cases we compare 
patterns of signs, magnitudes and significance for rural, suburban and urban single 
mothers. 8
8 Equations (23) and (24) do not exactly correspond to those in Graham and Beller’s (12) and (13) on page 
678. A careful reading of M addala’s and Greene’s textbooks and Greene’s LIMDEP econometric program 
on line manual suggests that a correction to Graham and Beller’s equations is necessary. In particular the 
term 1 /sq r(1 -rh o 2)  inside p [ .]o f (23) and (24) is missing in each of Graham and Beller’s equations.
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Before proceeding, certain naming conventions must be addressed. Define the
following names as representing the variables indicated:
GPRIMEA = 
GPRIMEF = 
NEGWTSA = 
NEGWTSF = 
NETWAGE = 
GAP =
GFDPP =
G'a
G'f
-WtA
-Wtp
w(l - tAPA - ^ fPf) 
GAPa
(G'f - tfG'aPa )Pf
Additional variables included in XA, XF and XH from (20), (21) and (25), respectively, are 
as named and defined in Table 1. These variable names plus those listed above are used 
in all tables, here and in the appendices.
Participation Results
When considering all three sets of participation equations in Table 2, two aspects 
are important to note. First, all three correlations between the error terms of each set, 
RHO(A,F), are positive and significant. For all single mother households, unobserved 
factors that increase the probability of participating in one program also increase the 
probability of participating in the other program. Second, keep in mind that the 
coefficients of all six participation equations are not easily interpreted. They are 
coefficients of the index function for participation. As such, they do not directly reveal 
how much the probability of participation will change if the variable in question changes. 
Nonetheless, significance, signs and magnitudes of index function coefficients in the 
table are suggestive of the direction and magnitudes of changes in participation 
probabilities and are appropriately discussed here.
Now turn to program attribute variables in the participation equations in Table 2, 
beginning with GPRIMEF (G 'f ) and GPRIMEA (G A ). Guaranteed household food 
stamp benefits at zero hours of work (GPRIMEF) have positive, though insignificant, 
effects on FSP participation regardless of where they reside. In contrast, guaranteed 
program benefits for AFDC (GPRIMEA) are positive and significant for suburban and 
urban households, but negative and insignificant for rural households. That is, the size of 
FSP benefits for all and AFDC benefits for rural single mother households have little or 
no effect on their respective probabilities of participation in those programs. Increasing 
the size of AFDC benefits, however, does significantly increase the probability that 
suburban and urban households participate in that program.
Coefficients for the difference in net wage rates on and off the programs, 
NEGWTSA (-wtA) and NEGWTSF (-wtF) are all positive, significantly so except for rural 
households’ NEGWTSF. These coefficients mean that an increase in the wage 
differences would reduce the probability of program participation. Such wage difference 
increases could arise from higher wages or higher program taxes on earnings, holding 
everything else, including program benefits, constant. Thus, wage rates single mothers
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can garner in the labor force together with program earnings taxes play an important roles 
in program participation decisions.
Now turn to highlights of the effects of the non-program variables on AFDC and 
FSP participation. These variables can be organized into five groups: (1) household 
economic resources; (2) labor market conditions; (3) characteristics of the single mothers 
including marital status, race, education, age and disability status; (4) household structure 
and (5) region of residence. Highlights for these groups are discussed in turn.
Household economic resources (UNEARN and TENURE) are uniformly 
negatively related to single mother households’ participation in AFDC and the FSP 
regardless of where they live. The coefficients for unearned income (UNEARN) are 
negative and large in all cases, but significantly different from zero only for the three 
AFDC participation equations. In contrast, the coefficients for homeownership 
(TENURE) are negative, small and statistically significant for both programs, with the 
exception of that for rural AFDC participation.
Labor market conditions as represented by the unemployment rates (UNRATE) 
have mixed effects on program participation depending on whether the household is 
rural, suburban or urban. For rural and urban households, as unemployment rates 
increase, participation in both programs increases as expected. The effect is significant 
only for urban households, however. The state UNRATE coefficients for suburban 
households’ AFDC and FSP participation are unexpectedly negative, though 
insignificantly different from zero.9
With respect to the group of single mothers’ characteristics, there are a number of 
notable effects on participation. The mother never having been married (NEVERMAR) 
is the only marital status that significantly affects participation in either program. Both 
suburban and urban never-married single mothers are significantly more likely to 
participate in the FSP than their respective widowed counterparts. Those in urban areas 
are also more likely to participate in AFDC. With respect to race, only urban black single 
mothers (BLACK) have significantly higher AFDC and FSP participation than their 
white counterparts.10 Mothers’ education levels (ED) have surprisingly large, positive 
and significant effects on suburban participation in both programs and on urban 
participation in AFDC. Perhaps higher education levels allow these mothers to negotiate 
the welfare system better than those with less education. Another characteristic of the 
mothers, their age (AGE), has no significant effect on participation regardless of where 
they live. In contrast, the final characteristic of mothers, their disability status
9 There are two possible reasons for these surprising results. First, these are state unemployment rates. It 
was not possible to link the most appropriate county-level female unemployment rates to the SIPP data. 
Hence, I'm not sure exactly what we're capturing here. Second, if suburban women are working to replace 
former husbands' child support payments lost through his unemployment and if employment results in 
being ineligible for AFDC or food stamps, these results are reasonable.
10 Note that there were too few rural observations of ORACE to allow estimation of the model, so the 
variable was dropped from the estimated equations.
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(DISABLED), significantly and positively effects AFDC and FSP participation of rural, 
suburban and urban households.
The estimated relationships between program participation and household 
structure variables (KIDS05, KIDS610, KIDS1117 and Na Du LTS) are interesting. All 
four of these variables have no significant effects on rural and suburban households’ FSP 
participation. For urban households, only the numbers of children in the two youngest 
children categories have significant positive effects on FSP participation. For AFDC, 
focus first on the number of children categories. All numbers of children by age category 
coefficients are positive, but significance varies depending on where they reside. For 
rural households the numbers of children in the youngest and oldest categories, for 
suburban households only the number of children in the youngest category and for urban 
households the numbers in the two youngest age categories have significant positive 
effects on AFDC participation. With respect to the number of adults in the household 
(NADULTS), the significant positive effect on AFDC participation is surprising, but it 
may be an artifact of how the children’s age categories were constructed. In particular, 
18-year-old children of the single mother were counted as adults. In this case, increases 
in NADULTS could logically increase AFDC participation.
The final group of non-program participation variables includes the regional 
categorical variables (MIDWe St , NOREAST and SOUTH). The coefficients for all 
three variables are negative in both participation equations for rural and suburban 
households. That is, suburban and rural households living in any of these regions are less 
likely to participate in AFDC or the FSP than are those who live in the West. The 
coefficients for the rural FSP participation equation are not significantly different from 
zero, however. Notably, the coefficient for the rural South is larger in magnitude that 
those of the rural Midwest or Northeast. Compared to rural western residents, rural 
southern residents are least likely to be AFDC participants holding everything else 
constant. In contrast, region of residence has no significant effect on urban AFDC 
participation. Further, urban residents of the Midwest and Northeast are significantly 
more likely to participate in the FSP than are urban western residents.
Two other methods for understanding the participation results are available in 
addition to considering the coefficients. First, conditional partial derivatives of the 
bivariate probability of participating in AFDC and the FSP with respect to each variable 
for each possible joint participation status can be calculated. The derivatives yield an 
answer to the following question: By how much will participation in both programs, 
AFDC only, FSP only and neither program change with a one unit change in each 
respective independent variable? While not discussed here, those partial derivatives or 
marginal effects are presented in appendix tables F1-F12 for the interested reader. A 
second approach is to simulate the percent changes in participation associated with each 
respective independent variable. We utilize this approach as a means to understand how 
AFDC and food stamp program attributes affect participation in our discussion of the 
policy parameters in Section V.
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Hours Results
The estimated hours equations for rural, suburban and urban single mothers are 
also presented in Table 2. Two general observations merit discussion. First, the adjusted 
R2 statistics for the hours equations range from 0.3985 for rural mothers to 0.5178 for 
urban mothers. These statistics are quite high for cross-section analyses such as those 
undertaken herein. The latter indicates that the urban hours equation explains more than 
half of the variation in urban single mothers’ labor supply (hours of work). Second, some 
of the coefficients on the lambda terms, 1AA and 1FF, have unexpected signs.
We would expect the signs for both lambda terms to be negative as was found by 
Fraker and Moffitt using a different econometric model. That is, we expect unobserved 
factors that increase AFDC and FSP participation to be negatively related to unobserved 
factors affecting hours of work. While we do find negative coefficients for 1FF for the 
food stamp program, only the urban coefficient is significantly different from zero. The 
coefficients on 1FF for the AFDC program, however, are all positive and significant, 
suggesting positive correlations between AFDC participation and hours equations’ error 
terms. This finding is counterintuitive and may be the result of incompletely specifying 
the relationships between the programs in the participation equations.
There are three variables in the hours equation that are functions of AFDC and 
food stamp program parameters and participation, NETWAGE, GAP and GFDPP. The 
latter two relate to the guaranteed benefits at zero hours of work G'APA and 
(G'f - rFG'AP ^P F, respectively. In general, we would expect hours of work to decline 
as guaranteed benefits increase. For GAP, we find the expected negative signs for all 
single mother households with rural and suburban responses significantly different from 
zero. For GFDPP we find only one negative sign for rural single mothers, but none of the 
responses are significantly different from zero. This could be due to the construction of 
the variable. GFDPP takes on the value of G'F if  the household participates only in the 
FSP or G'f - rFG'A if  they participate in both programs. The latter can never be less than 
zero. If the household participates in AFDC only or in neither program, GFDPP equals 
zero. Thus, this variable ranges from zero to G'F and may be zero for many households, 
given all the possible participation choices. Further explorations with alternative 
specifications that decouple the food stamp guarantee may yield better estimates of the 
effect of G'f on hours of work.
As expected, NETWAGE, w(1 - tAPA - tFPF), has positive and significant effects 
on single mothers’ labor supply regardless of where they reside. NETWAGE is a 
function of both the AFDC and FSP taxes on earnings. The significant positive 
coefficients for these variables mean that as net wages increase, either due to a wage 
increase or a reduction in program earnings taxes, hours of work increase. Even with this 
straightforward result, further discussion of the NETWAGE variable is needed.
As explained in Appendices B and C, tF = 0.246 and the AFDC earnings tax, tA, 
equals 1 or 0.67 depending upon whether the mother worked more than four months or 
four months or less, respectively. Thus, depending upon the household’s program 
participation status and the mother’s work history, the term in parentheses of the
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NETWAGE variable, 1 - tAPA - tFPF, takes on one of six possible values. If the 
household participates in neither program, the term equals one and NETWAGE equals 
the market wage, w. If the household participates only in the FSP, the term equals 0.754 
and NETWAGE equals 0.754w. Participation only in AFDC yields net wages of zero or 
0.33w, depending on the mother’s work history. Similarly, participation in both 
programs yields net wages of -0.246w or 0.084w. In Section I l’s descriptive analysis, we 
learned that even with labor supply of more than full time, some households participate 
only in AFDC and others in both programs. The single mothers of those households face 
net wages of -0.246w, 0, 0.084w or 0.33w. The latter two may yield virtually zero 
returns to work, given childcare costs. For the first one, childcare costs would make the 
return even more negative or change a zero return to a negative return, respectively.
Given a negative return to work, a rational single mother would not voluntarily 
choose to work. Only coercion could get her to do so. There must be something else 
going on. The likely “something” is the fact that AFDC households are categorically 
eligible for health insurance through Medicaid. That insurance, though not valued or 
included in the official definition of poverty or in the calculation of unearned income for 
the purpose of determining benefits, has unknown positive value to single mothers and 
their households. Thus, the apparently irrational choice to work, when participating in 
AFDC or in both programs, may actually be a rational choice.
Turning to the non-program variables in the hours equations, signs and 
significance of many of those variables are generally as expected. Unearned income 
(UNEARN), the state unemployment rate (UNRATE) and mothers’ disability status 
(DISABLED) all negatively effect labor supply, significantly so for all but suburban 
mothers’ UNRATE response. One interesting result is that single mothers’ race has no 
effect on hours of work regardless of where they live.
Single mothers’ marital status and their households’ family structure and region 
of residence have interesting signs and patterns of significance across the rural to urban 
continuum. The coefficients on all the marital status variables (DIV, SEP and 
NEVERMAR) are positive, indicating that these single mothers work more hours per 
week than their widowed counterparts. More importantly, for rural single mothers, only 
being divorced significantly increases labor supply. For suburban single mothers, being 
divorced or separated has significant effects and all three marital statuses are significant 
for urban single mothers. In all cases, divorced single mothers have the strongest labor 
force attachment.
With respect to children, only the number of children in the oldest age category 
for rural households is significant. Interestingly, the other family structure coefficients 
for the number of adults in the household (NADULTS) are positive for all households, 
significantly so for rural and urban households. This suggests that other adults in the 
household could take care of younger children while the mother works or they are 18- 
year old children who do not need day care.
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Midwestern, northeastern and southern rural single mothers work significantly 
more hours per week compared to western rural households. In contrast, suburban 
households exhibit no significant differences in labor supply based on region of 
residence. For urban single mothers, only residing in the northeast is significant. They 
work significantly fewer hours per week than their western urban counterparts.
G. Summary
In this section we developed and reported the estimation results for our 
econometric model of rural, suburban and urban single mothers’ AFDC and FSP program 
participation and labor supply decisions. The model follows directly from the theoretical 
framework in Section III and extends previous research. The model also addresses a 
number of econometric issues. Because wages are not observed for mothers who do not 
work, a Heckman two-step procedure was utilized to predict wages for each subsample 
based on working mothers’ wages. To account for possible correlation between the error 
terms of the program participation equations, a bivariate probit model of joint AFDC and 
FSP participation was estimated. Finally, to correct for the endogeneity of participation 
in the hours equations and to allow estimation of a continuous labor supply or hours 
function, rather than categories of labor supply, we implemented an endogeneity or 
sample selection correction procedure based on the bivariate probit estimates.
The estimation results indicate that the bivariate probit approach to estimating the 
program participation equations was appropriate, given the positive and statistically 
significant estimates of the error term correlations RHO(A,F). In contrast, the method of 
correcting for endogenous participation variables in the hours functions showed 
somewhat mixed results as indicated by some unexpected signs on the endogeneity 
correction factors, I aa in particular. Even so, this approach allowed estimation of 
continuous hours functions and the participation and hours estimates yield reasonable and 
interesting results.
Because we seek to guide states as they evaluate and/or redesign their own TANF 
cash welfare programs operating in tandem with the Federal FSP, we utilize our 
estimated model to address how particular AFDC and FSP policy parameters affect 
program participation and labor supply in the next section.
V. EFFECTS OF POLICY PARAMETERS
A. Introduction
This section focuses on AFDC and FSP program parameters that characterize 
each program’s structure. The parameters of interest are policy instruments: taxes on 
earnings (tA and tF); taxes on unearned income (rA and rF); and guaranteed benefits at zero 
hours of work (G’A and G ’F). Policymakers can use these policy parameters as tools or 
instruments of change. They can set or change the parameters to alter actual or potential 
recipients’ responses to programs, to better meet recipients’ needs and/or to change 
program costs. How single mothers respond to changes in these parameters is, therefore, 
important information. While other studies provide some guidance, here we offer 
specific information regarding how rural, suburban and urban single mothers change cash
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a n d  in -k in d  p ro g ra m  p a r tic ip a tio n  a n d  la b o r  su p p ly  in  re sp o n se  to  A F D C  a n d  F S P  p o lic y  
p a ra m e te r  ch an g es .
B . P a r t ic ip a tio n
T o  illu s tra te  h o w  A F D C  a n d  F S P  p ro g ra m  p a r tic ip a tio n  m ig h t a d ju s t to  p o lic y  
p a ra m e te r  c h a n g e s  w e  u til iz e  th e  b iv a r ia te  p ro b it  e s tim a te s  f ro m  T a b le  2  in  S e c tio n  IV .
W e  f irs t  se le c t a  re p re se n ta tiv e  s in g le  m o th e r ’s h o u se h o ld . T h e n  w e  a sk  th e  fo llo w in g  
q u e s tio n : H o w  w o u ld  h e r  h o u se h o ld  re sp o n d  to  c h a n g e s  in  p ro g ra m  p a ra m e te rs  i f  i t  w e re  
ru ra l, su b u rb a n  o r  u rb a n ?  A n sw e r in g  th a t  q u e s tio n  ta k e s  a  n u m b e r  o f  steps.
H o w  h e r  h o u s e h o ld ’s p ro g ra m  p a rtic ip a tio n  w o u ld  re sp o n d  to  a  ra n g e  o f  v a lu e s  
fo r  o n e  p ro g ra m  p a ra m e te r  as i f  sh e  w e re  a  re s id e n t o f  o n e  o f  th e  th re e  a re a s  is  p re d ic te d . 
H e r  h o u se h o ld  is  th e n  a r tif ic ia lly  “ tra n s fo rm e d ” in to  re s id e n ts  o f  th e  o th e r  a reas , in  tu rn , 
e a c h  tim e  v a ry in g  th e  sa m e  p ro g ra m  p a ra m e te r. W e  th e n  fo llo w  th e  sa m e  p ro c e d u re  fo r  
e a c h  o f  th e  o th e r  p ro g ra m  p a ra m e te rs . T h is  p ro c e s s  a llo w s  d is ti l la tio n  o f  b a s ic  
d iffe re n c e s  b e tw e e n  ru ra l, su b u rb a n  a n d  u rb a n  p ro g ra m  p a r tic ip a tio n  c h o ic e s  f ro m  th e  
b iv a r ia te  p ro b it m o d e l.
F o r  e x a m p le , fo r  th e  A F D C  ta x  o n  e a rn in g s , tA, w e  p re d ic t  fo u r  p a r tic ip a tio n  
p ro b a b ilitie s  fo r  a  n u m b e r  o f  p o ss ib le  v a lu e s  o f  th e  ta x  ra n g in g  fro m  c lo se  to  z e ro  to  o n e  
as i f  th e  re p re se n ta tiv e  h o u se h o ld  is  ru ra l. T h e  fo u r  p ro b a b ilitie s  in c lu d e  all p o ss ib le  
p a r tic ip a tio n  c o m b in a tio n s , th e  p ro b a b ility  o f  c h o o s in g  to  p a r tic ip a te  in  A F D C  an d  th e  
F S P , A F D C  o n ly , F S P  o n ly  a n d  in  n e ith e r  p ro g ra m . T o  d o  so, w e  u til iz e  th e  b iv a r ia te  
n o rm a l d is tr ib u tio n  e v a lu a te d  as a  fu n c tio n  o f  th e  a p p ro p r ia te  e s tim a te d  c o e ff ic ie n ts  an d  
e rro r  te rm  c o rre la tio n s  fro m  th e  ru ra l A F D C  a n d  F S P  p a r tic ip a tio n  e q u a tio n s  in  T a b le  2 
a n d  a s so c ia te d  re p re se n ta tiv e  h o u se h o ld  c h a ra c te r is tic s  as lis te d  in  T a b le  3. T o  
“ tra n s fo rm ” th e  h o u se h o ld  in to  a  su b u rb a n  a n d  th e n  an  u rb a n  one , w e  fo llo w  th e  sam e  
p ro c e d u re  a p p ly in g  th e  su b u rb a n  a n d  u rb a n  p a r tic ip a tio n  c o e f f ic ie n t a n d  c o rre la tio n  
e s tim a te s , in  tu rn .
F ig u re s  6, 7 a n d  8 p o r tra y  p a r tic ip a tio n  c h o ic e  p ro b a b ili t ie s  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  
c h a n g e s  in  th e  A F D C  e a rn in g s  ta x  w h e n  o u r  re p re se n ta tiv e  h o u se h o ld  is  ru ra l, su b u rb a n  
a n d  u rb a n , re sp e c tiv e ly . A s  a  g e n e ra l c o m p a riso n , a ll th re e  f ig u re s  sh o w  w h a t w e  w o u ld  
ex p ec t: T h e  p ro b a b ili t ie s  fo r  th e  tw o  c h o ic e s  th a t  in c lu d e  A F D C  (p a rtic ip a tio n  in  b o th  
p ro g ra m s  o r  A F D C  o n ly ) d e c lin e  a n d  th e  p ro b a b ili t ie s  o f  c h o o s in g  n e ith e r  p ro g ra m  o r 
o n ly  F S P  in c re a se  as th e  A F D C  e a rn in g s  ta x  in c rea se s . W h e n  th e  A F D C  ta x  is  le s s  th a n  
0.3 o u r  su b u rb a n  h o u se h o ld  c le a r ly  p re fe rs  p a r tic ip a tio n  o n ly  in  A F D C  to  all o th e r  
ch o ice s . A b o v e  th a t  p o in t  th e  p ro b a b ili ty  o f  n o  p ro g ra m  p a r tic ip a tio n  d o m in a te s , 
c lim b in g  to  0 .6 5  w h e n  tA re a c h e s  one.
W h ile  d if fe r in g  f ro m  th e  su b u rb a n  p a tte rn , th e  u rb a n  a n d  ru ra l p a tte rn s  a re  q u ite  
s im ila r. W h e n  u rb a n , th e  h o u s e h o ld ’s p ro b a b ility  o f  c h o o s in g  p a r tic ip a tio n  in  b o th  
p ro g ra m s  d o m in a te s  v ir tu a lly  th e  e n tire  A F D C  e a rn in g s  ta x  ra n g e . T h o se  u rb a n  
p ro b a b ilitie s  ra n g e  fro m  0 .73  to  0 .35  as th e  ta x  ra n g e s  f ro m  z e ro  to  one. W h e n  th e  
h o u se h o ld  is  ru ra l, th e  sa m e  ch o ic e , p a r tic ip a tio n  in  b o th  p ro g ra m s , d o m in a te s  fo r  m o s t o f  
th e  ta x  v a lu e  ran g e . W h e n  tA =  0, th a t  c h o ic e  p ro b a b ility  is  0 .6  a n d  re a c h e s  0 .3 4  w h e n  th e
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Table 3: Characteristics of the Representative Single Mother and Her Household
Variable Value
rA 1 
tA 0.67 
rp 0.3 
tp 0.246
GPRIMEA 127 
GPRIMEP 199 
w 5.54 
-wtA -3.7118 
-wtF -1.36284
UNEARN 300 
KIDS05 1 
KIDS610 1 
KIDS1117 0 
NADULTS 1 
DIV 0 
SEP 0 
NEVERMAR 1 
BLACK 1 
ORACE 0 
MIDWEST 0 
NOREAST 0 
SOUTH 1 
TENURE 0 
UNRATE 8.4 
DISABLED 0 
ED 12 
AGE 30
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tax is approximately 0.8. When tA = 1, the dominant choice probability is 0.42 for 
participation only in the FSP.
We see quite different patterns with changes in the FSP earnings tax (tF) in 
Figures 9, 10 and 11. Our representative household’s rural and urban dominant choices 
switch from participation in both programs to participation only in AFDC as FSP’s 
earnings tax increases. At tF = 0, rural and urban probabilities of participating in both 
programs are 0.6 and 0.7, respectively. At the other extreme of tF the rural and urban 
choices shift to 0.6 and 0.7 probabilities of participation only in AFDC, respectively. This 
switch is more dramatic when the household is rural and occurs at a lower level of tF.
As was the case for AFDC’s earnings tax, the suburban response to FSP’s 
earnings tax differs markedly from the urban and rural responses. As tF increases, the 
household switches abruptly from a strong likelihood of only FSP participation (0.75) to 
an equally strong likelihood of no program participation. The switch occurs at a low 
level of the FSP earnings tax, tF = 0.2.
For considering guaranteed maximum program benefits, we present only choice 
probability graphs for the AFDC guarantee, GPRIMEA in Figures 12, 13 and 14. We 
omit the FSP’s maximum benefit because GPRIMEF has no significant effect on FSP 
participation as shown in Table 2. In general, we would expect the AFDC only and 
AFDC plus FSP participation choice probabilities to increase as GPRIMEA increases. 
Both occur when our representative household is suburban or urban, but not when it is 
rural. Given that this variable is insignificant in the rural participation equation, a more 
appropriate depiction would be horizontal lines for the rural choice probabilities in Figure 
12. This would indicate no rural response to changes in GPRIMEA.
The suburban responses to changes in AFDC's guaranteed benefit substantially 
differ from rural and urban responses. If the household is suburban, the no-program- 
participation choice probabilities dominate all other choices for the entire range of AFDC 
guaranteed benefits, with a slight decline as the benefit increases. In contrast, the AFDC 
plus FSPchoice probabilities dominate the rural and urban cases. When urban, however, 
those choice probabilities and the ones for participation only in AFDC are higher than 
when the household is rural.
Figures 15, 16 and 17 show rural, urban and suburban responses of our 
representative household to changes in AFDC’s tax on unearned income, rA, respectively. 
Recalling that the corresponding tax for FSP affects participation only through 
statistically insignificant GPRIMEF, we do not graph those results. As was the case for 
GPRIMEA, suburban and urban choice probabilities associated with AFDC decline 
slightly and rural probabilities increase as AFDC’s unearned income tax increases. The 
latter should more appropriately be interpreted to be unchanged as these taxes change. 
Also similarly, for urban and rural cases the household’s probability of participating in 
both programs dominates all other choices for the entire range ofrA. The dominant 
suburban choice is no participation and the probability of that choice increases slightly as 
rA increases.
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Taken together, Figures 6 through 17 display patterns, which should be of interest 
to policymakers. Extrapolating from our representative household, all the policy 
parameters affect rural and urban households similarly. There are, however, some 
important differences. Rural households appear more responsive to changes in both 
AFDC and FSP earnings taxes than do urban households, particularly with respect to the 
FSP’s tax. That is, small increases in the FSP earnings tax would dramatically decrease 
the probability that rural households participate in that program. In contrast, urban 
households are somewhat more responsive to the other AFDC-related policy parameters 
than are their rural counterparts. Urban households reduce AFDC-related participation 
choices when AFDC’s unearned income tax increases. Their choice probabilities 
increase along with AFDC’s guaranteed benefit. Rural households’ program 
participation choices are virtually unaffected by either policy parameter change.
Suburban households’ responses to policy parameter changes generally differ 
markedly from those of the rural and urban counterparts. Regardless of which parameter 
changes, suburban households predominantly choose no program participation. The 
effect is most dramatic for changes in the FSP earnings tax. While not the predominant 
choices, suburban households also have second-level responses to policy parameter 
changes. As AFDC’s earning tax increases, suburban households’ choice probabilities do 
shift away from AFDC-related participation toward FSP only participation. Similarly, as 
FSP’s earnings tax increases, they shift away from FSP-related participation toward 
AFDC only participation. Finally, they increase their AFDC-related participation with 
increases in GPRIMEA and decrease such participation with reductions in AFDC’s 
unearned income tax.
C. Hours of Work
Correct interpretation of how the six policy parameters, tA, tF, rA, rF, G’A and G’F 
affect single mothers’ hours of work is more complex than might appear at first glance. 
The policy parameters appear in at least one of three hours equation variables, GAP = 
G'aPa, NETWAGE = w(1 - tAPA - tfPF) and GFDPP = (G'f - rFG'aPa )Pf- The most 
appropriate method for evaluating how these parameters work their way through these 
variables and affect hours or labor supply is to calculate elasticities.
As a first step toward obtaining these elasticities is to calculate partial derivatives 
of the hours equation (25) with respect to the policy parameters as follows: 8
(26a) dHJdtA = C2PA,
(26b) dHJdtF = C2PF,
(26c) 8HJ8rA = C4(8G'a J8 rA)PA - c5 rF(8GA J8 ^ ) P aPf,
(26d) dHJdrF = C5(8G'f J8 rF - G'aPa)Pf,
(26e) dH/dGA = c4Pa - c5rFPAPF and
(26f) 8HJ8G'f  = C5PF.
8 Here we ignore the complex effects through the lambda terms because they are present to generate 
unbiased estimates of the other coefficients in the hours equation.
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T h e  n e x t s tep  w o u ld  b e  to  m u ltip ly  e a ch  o f  th e  p a rtia l d e riv a tiv e s  b y  th e  a p p ro p ria te  
p o lic y  p a ra m e te r  d iv id e d  b y  h o u rs  o f  w o rk , e v a lu a te d  a t th e  re le v a n t su b sa m p le  m e a n s  to  
y ie ld  th e  e la s tic it ie s  o f  h o u rs  w ith  re sp e c t to  th e  re le v a n t  p o lic y  p a ra m e te r . N o te , 
h o w e v e r , th o se  e la s tic it ie s  a s su m e  p a r tic ip a tio n  is h e ld  c o n s ta n t, w h ic h  w e  k n o w  is  n o t 
th e  case . A n y  p o lic y  p a ra m e te r  c h a n g e  s im u lta n e o u s ly  a lte rs  p a r t ic ip a tio n  an d  h o u rs  o f  
w o rk . P ro g ra m  p a rtic ip a tio n , th e re fo re , m u s t  a lso  b e  a llo w e d  to  v a ry  to  fu lly  u n d e rs ta n d  
h o w  p o lic y  p a ra m e te rs  e ffe c t h o u rs  o f  w o rk .
W e , th e re fo re , c a lc u la te  h o u rs  ( a rc )  e la s tic it ie s  as fo llo w s . F irs t, w e  p re d ic t  th e  
p ro b a b ility  o f  p a r tic ip a tio n  in  e a c h  p ro g ra m  fo r  e a c h  o b se rv a tio n . T h o se  p re d ic te d  
p ro b a b ilit ie s  a re  su b s titu te d  fo r  ac tu a l p a r tic ip a tio n  in  th e  h o u rs  e q u a tio n  to  p re d ic t  h o u rs  
o f  w o rk  fo r  ea ch  o b se rv a tio n . T h e n  w e  in c re a se  o n e  o f  th e  p o lic y  p a ra m e te rs , tA fo r  
e x a m p le , b y  te n  p e rc e n t, an d  re -p re d ic t  p a r tic ip a tio n  p ro b a b ilit ie s  an d  h o u rs  o f  w o rk , in  
tu rn . T h e  d iffe re n c e  b e tw e e n  th e  o rig in a l p re d ic tio n  a n d  th a t  o b ta in e d  a f te r  th e  ten -  
p e rc e n t c h a n g e  in  tA is  th e  v a lu e  o f  th e  e la s tic ity . W e  re p e a t  th e  p ro c e ss  fo r  e a ch  o f  th e  
o th e r  f iv e  p o lic y  p a ra m e te rs . T h e  re su ltin g  e la s tic it ie s  sh o u ld  b e  in te rp re te d  as th e  p e rc e n t 
c h a n g e  in  h o u rs  o f  w o rk  a ris in g  fro m  a  te n -p e rc e n t  c h a n g e  in  th e  p o lic y  p a ra m e te rs , 
a llo w in g  p ro g ra m  p a rtic ip a tio n  to  v ary .
T h e  e la s tic itie s  fo r  ru ra l, su b u rb a n  an d  u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e rs  a re  p re se n te d  in  
T a b le  4. W e  re p o r t  th e  2 5 th, 50 th (m e d ian ) an d  7 5 th p e rc e n tile  fo r  e a c h  e la s tic ity  as w e ll 
as m e a n s  an d  s ta n d a rd  d e v ia tio n s  b e c a u s e  th e  e la s tic ity  d is tr ib u tio n s  a re  g e n e ra lly  h ig h ly  
skew ed .
T h e  h o u rs  e la s tic itie s  fo r  tA, l is ted  in  th e  f irs t  re su lts  c o lu m n  o f  T a b le  4  in d ic a te  
th a t  a  te n  p e rc e n t  in c re a se  in  A F D C ’s e a rn in g s  ta x  ra ise s  a v e ra g e  h o u rs  o f  w o rk  b y  0 .5 1 , 
0 .2 6  a n d  0 .5 6  p e rc e n t  o n  a v e ra g e  fo r  ru ra l, u rb a n  a n d  su b u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s , re sp e c tiv e ly . 
G iv e n  a v e ra g e  w e e k ly  w o rk  h o u rs  o f  23 , 25  a n d  19 fo r  th o se  sa m e  c o h o rts , th e se  m e a n  
e la s tic it ie s  im p ly  w e e k ly  la b o r  su p p ly  in c re a se s  o f  0 .1 2 , 0 .0 7  a n d  0 .11  h o u rs  p e r  w e e k  b y  
ru ra l, su b u rb a n  an d  u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e rs , re sp e c tiv e ly .
T h ese  e la s tic it ie s  ra is e  th re e  im p o r ta n t  p o in ts . F irs t, an  in te re s tin g  s to ry  c a n  b e  
to ld  f ro m  th e  d is tr ib u tio n s  o f  th e s e  e la s tic itie s . E v e n  th o u g h  th e  a v e ra g e  e ffe c ts  o f  th e  
A F D C  e a rn in g s  ta x  a re  p o s itiv e , th o se  m e a n s  fa ll so m e w h e re  b e tw e e n  th e  m e d ia n  an d  th e  
7 5 th p e rc e n tile  o f  th e  e la s tic ity  d is tr ib u tio n s  fo r  a ll s in g le  m o th e rs . F u r th e rm o re , th o se  
e la s tic itie s  a re  z e ro  o r  v ir tu a lly  z e ro  fo r  a t le a s t  th e  f irs t  q u a rti le  o f  h o u se h o ld s , re g a rd le ss  
o f  w h e re  th ey  liv e . F ro m  th e  v a n ta g e  o f  th e  m ed ia n , a t le a s t  h a l f  o f  th e  s in g le  m o th e rs  
h a v e  l ittle  o r  n o  c h a n g e  in  la b o r  su p p ly  a sso c ia te d  w ith  th e  A F D C  e a rn in g s  ta x  in c rease .
S eco n d , th e  ru ra l a n d  u rb a n  e la s tic ity  m e a n s  a n d  d is tr ib u tio n s  fo r  tA a re  re la tiv e ly  
s im ila r, y e t  q u ite  d if fe re n t th a n  th o se  fo r  su b u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s . O n e  m ig h t try  to  e x p la in  
th is  p a tte rn  b y  lo o k in g  fo r  c o rre sp o n d in g  d if fe re n c e s  an d  s im ila ritie s  in  A F D C  
p a rtic ip a tio n . T h a t is, p e rh a p s  su b u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s  a re  le ss  re sp o n s iv e  to  c h a n g es  in  th e  
A F D C  e a rn in g s  ta x  ra te  b e c a u se  th e y  a re  le s s  l ik e ly  to  p a rtic ip a te  in  th e  p ro g ra m . R u ra l 
h o u s e h o ld s ’ p a r t ic ip a tio n  (2 6  p e rc e n t)  is  c lo s e r  to  th a t  o f  th e ir  su b u rb a n  (2 2  p e rc e n t)  th a n  
th e ir  u rb a n  (3 7  p e rc e n t)  c o u n te rp a r ts . T h u s , th e  p a r t ic ip a tio n  p a tte rn s  c a n n o t e x p la in  w h y
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Table 4: Distribution of the Elasticity of Total Hours with respect to Changes in 
AFDC and Food Stamp Program Policy Parameters
Policy Parameters
Sub­
Sample Statistic ta tf ra rf gprimea gprimef
Rural
25th Percentile
Median
75th Percentile
0.0000
0.1129
0.5715
-0.7795
-0.3347
-0.1347
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0215
0.0000
0.0140
-0.0046
0.0000
0.0021
-2.6660
-0.9055
0.0000
Mean
Std. Deviation
0.5062
2.4697
-1.2756
2.4746
0.4770
0.5187
0.1046*
0.6682
-0.3897
1.5132
-1.5178
6.1431
Suburban
25th Percentile
Median
75th Percentile
0.0008
0.0432
0.3214
-5.1991
-2.2655
-0.4945
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0069
0.0000
0.0052
-0.4184
-0.0721
-0.0090
-0.5382
-0.1703
-0.0182
Mean
Std. Deviation
0.2607
0.8206
-2.5063
5.8660
0.0049
0.0430
0.2477
5.2055
-0.5464
1.4139
-0.6454
1.4716
Urban
25th Percentile
Median
75th Percentile
0.0000
0.1870
0.5910
-0.1370
0.0000
0.0181
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
-0.0478
-0.0055
0.0000
-0.6890
-0.1629
0.0000
0.0000
0.0229
0.1554
Mean
Std. Deviation
0.5623
6.2828
-0.1990
0.6784
0.0299
0.5088
-0.1296
0.7372
-0.6306
1.4056
0.7123
7.2351
* One observation was dropped for calculating the mean and standard deviation 
of rf because it was an extreme outlier.
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rural and urban households have such similar responses to AFDC’s earnings tax. High 
urban program participation, however, might explain why urban households are most 
responsive to the AFDC earnings tax.
Third, the direction of these elasticities seems counterintuitive. A priori, one 
might expect work hours to decline because higher taxes on earnings reduce returns to 
work. With welfare programs and negative income tax schemes more generally, 
participation must also be considered. Higher earnings taxes (lower benefits) can make 
program participation less attractive. So, some households may choose nonparticipation. 
Others may become ineligible for program benefits. Their nonparticipation, in turn, 
increases their work effort. The fact that all three participation coefficients for 
NEGWTSA (-wtA) in Table 2 are positive and significant reinforces this argument. The 
decrease in the probability of AFDC participation associated with the earnings tax 
increase must outweigh the direct reduction in work effort one might expect through 
NETWAGE in the hours equation to yield the positive hours elasticities we observe for 
this policy parameter.
For the FSP’s earnings tax (tF), the means and distributions of elasticities are quite 
different. All the means are negative, rather than positive, despite the fact that the FSP 
participation coefficients for NEGWTSF (-wtF) are all positive, as are those for AFDC. 
Here, average hours responses appear relatively less affected by program participation 
reductions and the expected direct reduction in work from the tax increase dominates. 
With mean elasticities of -0.13, -2.51 and -0.20, rural, suburban and urban single 
mothers would reduce their labor supply by 0.03, 0.63 and 0.04 hours per week 
respectively, on average, if  the FSP earnings tax increases by ten percent.
The distributions of elasticities for the FSP earnings tax also differ dramatically 
from those for AFDC. Overall, suburban households are most responsive to the FSP 
earnings tax along the entire distribution, even though substantially fewer of them (27 
percent) participate in the program compared to rural (43 percent) and urban (46 percent) 
households. In contrast, urban households are least responsive and also have a unique 
pattern wherein their responses shift from negative to positive. For the latter, the 
reduction in participation associated with the FSP earnings tax increase dominates the 
expected direct effect of reduced net wages on work hours, as was the case with the 
AFDC tax. For others, the reverse appears to be the case.
While we do not go into the same level of detail for changes in other program 
parameters, there are important highlights. The AFDC tax on unearned income (rA) has 
virtually no effect on hours of work, except for less than a quarter of rural and urban 
households. The FSP’s corollary tax ( rF ) has somewhat more of an effect, albeit small. 
Within each subsample the elasticities range from negative to positive.
The patterns and magnitudes of the hours elasticities with respect to the values of 
households’ guaranteed maximum program benefits, GPRIMEA (G’A) and GPRIMEF 
(G’f) are interesting. Holding program participation constant, one would expect increases 
in benefits increase to reduce hours of work if leisure is a normal good. Also, increases
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in  g u a ra n te e d  b e n e fits  m a y  in c re a se  p ro g ra m  p a rtic ip a tio n  an d  in d ire c tly  fu r th e r  re d u c e  
h o u rs  o f  w o rk . A s  sh o w n  in  T a b le  2 , e x c e p t fo r  ru ra l A F D C  p a rtic ip a tio n , in c re a se d  
g u a ra n te e d  b e n e f i ts  g e n e ra lly  d o  in c re a se  p a r tic ip a tio n  in  b o th  e q u a tio n s .
A F D C ’s b e n e f i ts  e n te r  th e  h o u rs  fu n c tio n s  p o s it iv e ly  th ro u g h  G A P  a n d  n e g a tiv e ly  
th ro u g h  G F D P P . T h o se  e ffe c ts  in  c o m b in a tio n  w ith  th e  in d ire c t  p a r tic ip a tio n  e ffe c ts  
tra n s la te  in to  n e g a tiv e  m e a n  h o u r  e la s tic itie s  fo r  all s in g le  m o th e rs . T h e  ru ra l, su b u rb a n  
a n d  u rb a n  h o u rs  e la s tic it ie s  w ith  re sp e c t to  a  te n  p e rc e n t  in c re a s e  in  A F D C  b e n e fits  a re  
- 0 .3 9 ,  -0 .5 5  an d  - 0 .6 3  a n d  g e n e ra te  re d u c tio n s  o f  0 .0 8 , 0 .1 4  a n d  0 .1 2  h o u rs  o f  w o rk  p e r  
w e e k  o n  a v e ra g e , re sp e c tiv e ly . E v e n  so, th e  e la s tic ity  d is tr ib u tio n s  sh o w  th a t  th e  A F D C  
g u a ra n te e d  b e n e f i t  h a s  n o  e ffe c t fo r  so m e  ru ra l an d  u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s . F o r  o th e r  ru ra l an d  
p o ss ib ly  o th e r  u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s  A F D C , b e n e f i ts  h a v e  a  sm all b u t  p o s it iv e  e ffe c t o n  w o rk  
h o u rs.
F S P  b e n e fits  e n te r  th e  h o u rs  fu n c tio n  d ire c tly  th ro u g h  G F D P P . R e c a ll  f ro m  T a b le  
2  th a t  G F D P P  c o e ff ic ie n ts  a re  a ll in s ig n if ic a n t an d  o n ly  th e  ru ra l c o e ff ic ie n t is  n e g a tiv e . 
F S P  b e n e f i ts  p o s it iv e ly , th o u g h  in s ig n if ic a n tly , a ffe c t p ro g ra m  p a rtic ip a tio n  b y  all s in g le  
m o th e r  h o u se h o ld s . T o g e th e r , th e se  d ire c t a n d  in d ire c t e ffe c ts  g e n e ra te  n e g a tiv e  m e a n  
e la s tic it ie s  fo r  ru ra l a n d  u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s  o f  - 1 .5 2  a n d  - 0 .6 5 ,  re sp e c tiv e ly , a n d  a  p o s it iv e  
m e a n  e la s tic ity  fo r  u rb a n  h o u se h o ld s  o f  0 .71 . O n  a v e rag e , w e e k ly  h o u rs  o f  w o rk  b y  
ru ra l, su b u rb a n  a n d  u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e rs  c h a n g e  b y  -0 .3 5 , -0 .1 6  a n d  0 .1 4 , re sp e c tiv e ly , 
w h e n  G P R IM E A  in c re a se s  b y  10 p e rcen t.
B a s e d  u p o n  th e  d is tr ib u tio n s  o f  G P R IM E F  e la s tic itie s , m o s t o r  a ll o f  th e  su b u rb a n  
e la s tic it ie s  a re  n e g a tiv e  w h ile  th o se  fo r  u rb a n  h o u s e h o ld s  a re  p o s itiv e . F o r  ru ra l 
h o u se h o ld s , th e y  ra n g e  fro m  s tro n g ly  n e g a tiv e  to  ze ro . T h u s , ru ra l a n d  su b u rb a n  
e la s tic it ie s  w ith  r e s p e c t  to  F S  b e n e f i ts  b e h a v e  as e x p e c te d . B u t, th e  u rb a n  e la s tic it ie s  a re  
c o u n te r in tu it iv e . G iv e n  F S P  b e n e f i ts ’ in s ig n if ic a n c e  in  b o th  th e  h o u rs  a n d  p a r tic ip a tio n  
e q u a tio n s , p e rh a p s  th e  u rb a n  e la s tic itie s  sh o u ld  b e  g iv e n  little  c red en ce . I t  is  m o re  lik e ly  
th a t  th e y  are, in  fac t, zero .
S in g le  m o th e r s ’ la b o r  su p p ly  re sp o n se s  to  c h a n g e s  in  p ro g ra m  p a ra m e te rs  as 
m e a su re d  b y  th e  m e a n  e la s tic itie s  as  w e ll as th e ir  d is tr ib u tio n s  in  T a b le  4 , h a v e  
in te re s t in g  p o lic y  im p lic a tio n s . A s  a  m e a n s  fo r  s u m m a riz in g  th e  e ffe c ts  o f  p o lic y  
c h a n g e s  o n  s in g le  m o th e r s ’ la b o r  su p p ly ; a v e ra g e  c h a n g e s  in  w e e k ly  h o u rs  o f  w o rk  
d e riv e d  fro m  th e  c a lc u la te d  e la s tic it ie s  a re  p re se n te d  in  T a b le  5. A s  th e  ta b le  in d ic a te s , 
re sp o n se s  to  p ro g ra m  ta x e s  o n  u n e a rn e d  in c o m e  (rA a n d  rF) a re  q u ite  sm all, w ith  th e  
e x c e p tio n  o f  ru ra l h o u s e h o ld s ’ re s p o n s e  to  A F D C ’s tax , a n d  p re d o m in a n tly  p o s it iv e  in  
re sp o n se  to  F S P ’s tax . M o s t h o u se h o ld s  in c re a se  e a rn in g s  to  m a k e  u p  fo r  b e n e fit  
red u c tio n s  a s so c ia te d  w ith  in c re a se d  ta x e s  o n  u n e a rn e d  in co m e .
T e n -p e rc e n t in c re a se s  in  A F D C ’s a n d  F S P ’s e a rn in g s  ta x e s  (tA an d  tF) g en e ra te  
o p p o s ite  e ffe c ts  o n  s in g le  m o th e r s ’ h o u rs  o f  w o rk . T h e  p o s it iv e  A F D C  re sp o n se s  m ay  
a rise  b e c a u s e  th e  p ro g ra m  b e c o m e s  le s s  a ttra c tiv e  to  so m e  h o u s e h o ld s  o r  b e c a u s e  o th e rs  
b e c o m e  in e lig ib le . H e n c e , th o se  s in g le  m o th e rs  in c re a se  th e ir  la b o r  supp ly . F o r  th e  
n e g a tiv e  F S P  re sp o n se s , th e  in c re a se  in  th e  ta x  a n d  its  a s so c ia te d  re d u c tio n  in  th e  re tu rn
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Table 5: Weekly Hours of Work Changes as Policy 
Parameters Change
Policy Parameter Rural Suburban Urban
tA 0.12 0.07 0.11
tF -0.03 -0.63 -0.04
rA 0.11 0.00 0.01
rF 0.02 0.06 -0.02
GPRIMEA -0.08 -0.14 -0.12
GPRIMEF -0.35 -0.16 0.14
Note: These are not conventional elasticities. These reflect the percent 
change in work hours from a ten  percent change in the policy
to work may outweigh any indirect effects due to reductions in FSP participation. Rural 
and urban single mothers respond similarly to both tax changes. Suburban mothers 
respond quite differently, particularly in their very strong negative response to increases 
in food stamp earnings taxes.
With one exception, all households reduce hours of work when AFDC and FSP 
guaranteed benefits, GPRIMEA and GPRIMEF, increase by ten percent. For the AFDC 
benefit increase, rural single mothers reduce labor supply the least and suburban mothers 
the most, 0.08 and 0.14 hours per week, respectively. In contrast, rural single mothers 
have the largest reduction in hours when FSP’s guarantee increases (0.35), followed by 
suburban mothers’ reduction (0.16). Urban households increase their labor supply when 
food stamp benefits increase.
D. Summary
In this section we have utilized two different techniques for understanding how 
rural, suburban and urban single mothers and their households respond to changes in 
AFDC and FSP program parameters. For our participation analysis we illustrated how a 
representative single mothers’ household would respond to program parameter changes if 
it was transformed from a rural, to a suburban and than to an urban household. This 
allowed us to distill from the bivariate probit estimates the basic differences between 
rural, suburban and urban program participation choices probabilities as programs 
parameters changed. To analyze how rural, suburban and urban single mothers’ hours of 
work change as program parameters change we calculated arc elasticities of labor supply 
with respect to changes in each program parameter. Our elasticity calculations crucially 
allowed program participation to vary as well as direct responses to program parameter 
changes.
Both analytical methods add to our understanding of how program parameters can 
be set or changed to meet various policy objects with respect to low-income single 
mothers and their families. In particular we were able to highlight similarities and
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important differences between how rural suburban and urban single parents and their 
families might be affected by and respond to changes in safety net programs. These 
highlights will be of use to state policymakers as they evaluate and/or redesign cash 
welfare programs for their own state residents.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is unique. It provides information and analyses regarding rural, 
suburban and urban single mothers’ AFDC, FSP and labor force participation decisions. 
Others studies extensively explore the linkages between AFDC or negative income tax 
cash transfer programs and labor supply and only two other studies addresses single 
mothers’ joint decisions regarding FSP, AFDC and labor supply. Until now, no one has 
explored whether and how rural, suburban and urban differentially respond to those 
programs and to labor market conditions.
To do so, data are utilized that are not normally available for public use, the in­
house version of the Census Bureau’s 1984 Panel of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, which allows accurate identification of where surveyed households reside. 
The focus is on SIPP’s single mother households because they are most at risk of poverty 
and need for support from state and Federal safety net programs.
This study has four basic components. First, poverty status, AFDC and FSP 
participation choices, and labor supply patterns of rural, suburban and urban single 
mothers are described. Particular attention is paid to the characteristics of those mothers 
and their households that may explain differences in program participation and labor 
supply. Second, a microeconomic theoretical framework is developed as a means for 
understanding the interlinked AFDC, FSP and labor supply decisions. Third, that 
theoretical model provides the foundation for developing an econometric model of those 
decisions. The model is estimated separately for rural, suburban and urban households. 
The estimates are used to highlight determinants of single mothers’ program participation 
and labor supply and how those determinants differ for rural, suburban and urban single 
mothers and their households. Finally, we consider the effects of several program 
parameters, the basic building blocks for designing cash and in-kind transfer programs. 
We utilize the econometric estimates to analyze how changes in AFDC and FSP program 
parameters affect rural, urban and suburban single mothers’ program participation and 
hours of work. The purpose of this exercise is to inform state decision-makers regarding 
how to evaluate or restructure their own cash welfare programs under TANF operating in 
tandem with the Federal food stamp program.
From our descriptive analysis we learn that urban households are most likely to be 
in poverty and to participate in AFDC and the FSP and least likely to be in the labor 
force. The opposite is true for suburban households with rural households somewhere in 
between. Of working single mothers, however, rural households have the highest overall 
program participation and rely most heavily on the FSP and least on AFDC. Some single 
mother households from all areas and particularly those in rural areas continue to be 
eligible for and receive food stamps or AFDC benefits even though they are working
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more than full time. Thus, even with extraordinary work effort, these mothers’ earnings 
are insufficient to pull their households out of poverty or near poverty.
The theoretical model of utility maximization shows that program participation 
decisions depend upon comparisons of utility gains on and off the programs. Labor 
supply is shown to be a function of net market wages (net of program taxes), guaranteed 
program benefits, unearned income and endogenous program participation.
The econometric model involves two linked components. The first is bivariate 
probit estimation of the AFDC and FSP participation decision. Bivariate estimation is 
necessary to account for possible correlation between the error terms of the participation 
equations. Those participation estimates are linked to the second component, estimation 
of the hours equation, due to the endogeneity of the participation decisions. The 
participation estimates are used to calculate endogeneity or sample selection correction 
factors, which are included as auxiliary variables in the hours equations. This approach 
allows estimation of continuous hours functions. The bivariate probit estimates show 
significant positive correlation between the error terms of the participation equations, 
indicating that bivariate rater than univariate estimation is appropriate. The method of 
correcting for endogenous participation in the hours equations, however, yields mixed 
results with unexpected significant positive hours equation coefficients for the AFDC- 
related auxiliary variable. Nonetheless, the participation and hours equation estimates 
reasonably explain variation in AFDC, FSP and hours of work decisions.
From the coefficient estimates we learn that the size of FSP and AFDC benefits 
generally increase participation in their respective programs. However, these effects are 
significant only for suburban and urban responses to AFDC benefits. The differences in 
wage rates on and off the programs have significant positive affects on participation.
That is, wage rates single mothers can garner and/or program earnings taxes they face 
significantly affect program participation. In the hours equation, net wages have 
significant positive effects on hours of work. That is, as net wage rates increase, hours of 
work increase.
From this analysis of rural, suburban and urban single mothers’ participation 
responses to changes in program parameters, we learn that all the parameters affect rural 
and urban participation choices similarly. As program parameter changes make programs 
more or less attractive, rural and urban households shift into and away from those 
programs, respectively, in a similar fashion. Notably, given favorable program 
parameters, rural and urban households’ predominantly choose participation in both 
programs. As one program parameter changes, they predominantly shift to participation 
in the other program only rather than overall nonparticipation. In contrast, regardless of 
which parameter changes, suburban households predominantly choose no program 
participation, although some do exhibit similar though smaller responses to those of their 
urban and rural counterparts.
Compared to the participation effects, some program parameters have more 
complex and, in some cases, counterintuitive effects on hours of work. The taxes on
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u n e a rn e d  in c o m e  h a v e  v ir tu a lly  n o  e ffe c t o n  h o u rs  o f  w o rk  re g a rd le s s  o f  w h e re  th e  s in g le  
m o th e r  re s id e s . F o r  e a rn in g s  ta x e s , ru ra l a n d  u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e rs  in c re a se  la b o r  su p p ly  
w h e n  A F D C ’s ta x  in c re a se s  a n d  d o  so  b y  m o re  th a n  su b u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e rs  do . In  
c o n tra s t, th e y  d e c re a se  th e ir  la b o r  su p p ly  m u c h  le s s  th a n  su b u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e rs  w h e n  
F S P ’s ta x  in c re a se s . In  th e  c a se  o f  g u a ra n te e d  b e n e f its  v ir tu a lly  all s in g le  m o th e rs  re d u c e  
th e ir  la b o r  su p p ly  as b e n e f its  in c re a se . R u ra l s in g le  m o th e rs  h a v e  th e  s tro n g e s t re d u c tio n  
in  la b o r  su p p ly  w h e n  fo o d  s tam p  b e n e fits  in c rease .
R e s u lts  su c h  as th e s e  a re  p a r tic u la r ly  t im e ly  b e c a u s e  o u r  se p a ra te  a n a ly se s  o f  
ru ra l, su b u rb a n  a n d  u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e r s ’ p ro g ra m  p a r tic ip a tio n  a n d  la b o r  su p p ly  
b e h a v io rs  c a n  in fo rm  s ta te  p o lic y m a k e rs . T o  th e  e x te n t th a t  a  p a r tic u la r  s ta te  is  la rg e ly  
ru ra l, fo r  ex a m p le , th e  ru ra l re su lts  sh o u ld  b e  o f  p a r tic u la r  in te re s t. O r, i f  s ta te s  h a v e  
v a ry in g  p ro p o rtio n s  o f  ru ra l, su b u rb a n  a n d  u rb a n  s in g le  m o th e r  h o u se h o ld s , th e y  n e e d  to  
u n d e rs ta n d  h o w  su c h  h o u se h o ld s  d iffe re n tia lly  re s p o n d  to  p a r tic u la r  p ro g ra m  p a ra m e te rs  
a n d  ta k e  su c h  d iffe re n c e s  in to  ac c o u n t, to  th e  e x te n t p o ss ib le , as th e y  re d e s ig n  an d  
e v a lu a te  th e  e ffe c tiv e n e s s  o f  th e ir  T A N F  p ro g ra m s.
T h is  re se a rc h  p ro je c t le a v e s  m a n y  q u e s tio n s  u n a n sw e re d  as d o  all su ch  p ro jec ts . 
T e c h n ic a l q u e s tio n s  re m a in  re g a rd in g  th e  b e s t  w a y  to  c a p tu re  lin k a g e s  b e tw e e n  p ro g ra m s  
a n d  e s tim a te  c o n tin u o u s  la b o r  su p p ly  fu n c tio n s  w ith  e n d o g e n o u s  p a rtic ip a tio n .
A lte rn a tiv e  m e th o d s  sh o u ld  b e  p u rsu ed . W h e n  d a ta  a re  a v a ila b le  in  a  y e a r  o r  tw o  it  
w o u ld  b e  e n lig h te n in g  to  re p lic a te  th is  s tu d y  a n d  see  h o w  ru ra l, su b u rb a n  a n d  u rb a n  
s in g le  m o th e rs  a n d  th e ir  fa m ilie s  fa re  u n d e r  fu ll im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  so m e  w e lfa re  re fo rm , 
w h e n  s in g le  m o th e rs  re a c h  th e ir  5 -y e a r  l ife tim e  lim it o n  T A N F  b e n e fits  a n d  w h e n  w e  
o b se rv e  th e  e c o n o m y  g o in g  in to  an d  p e rh a p s  o u t o f  a  rece ss io n .
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APPENDIX A
Statistics for Differences Between Rural
Suburban and Urban Variable Means
Table A1: T-statistics for the Differences Between Variable Means 
by Residence
R u ra l R u ra l U rb a n
U rb a n S u b u rb S u b u r b
Continuous Variables
AGE 0.613 -0.936 -1.864 **
ED 0.086 -2.415*** -2.833 ***
DISABLED 0.114 1.049 1.129
FAMSIZE -1.233 0.221 1.680 **
NADULTS -0.849 -0.632 0.224
KIDS05 -0.714 2.233 ** 3.546 ***
KIDS610 -0.666 0.236 1.059
KIDS1117 -0.146 -1.334* -1.409*
TENURE 4.744 *** -2.093** -8.016***
WDUM 2.402 *** -1.670** -4.752 ***
TOTHRS -0.321 -0.671 -0.446
WAGE 0.130 -0.356 -1.571 *
EARNED -0.214 -3.357** -4.115***
UNEARNED 1.583 * -5.104 ** -6.882 ***
CHLDSUPT 4.271 *** -0.606 -5.677 ***
CSUPTAMT -1.748 ** -5.412*** -2.946 ***
FPART -0.840 4.930 *** 6.947 ***
FSBEN 2.187 ** 3.356 *** 1.809 **
APART -3.124 *** 1.982 ** 5.971 ***
AFDCBEN -4.684 *** -4.967 *** -1.159
UNRATE 4.899 *** 2.893 *** -2.446 ***
Categorical Variables
BLACK -8.032 *** 0.997 10.307 ***
ORACE -0.937 -2.997 *** -2.357 ***
SEP -1.854 ** -0.231 1.819 **
DIV 5.299 *** 0.599 -5.348 ***
NEVERMAR -6.305 *** -1.155 5.539 ***
SOUTH 2.990 *** 4.008 *** 1.344 *
MIDWEST 0.141 1.141 1.202
NOREAST -3.478 *** -3.925 *** -0.701
* Indicates significance at a =0.10, one-tailed test 
** Indicates significance at a =0.05, one-tailed test 
***Indicates significance at a =0.01, one-tailed test
Source: Survey of Income and Program Participation, 1984 Panel, Third Wave
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APPENDIX B
Calculations of AFDC Benefit
APPENDIX B
Calculations of AFDC Benefit
All states’ AFDC benefit formulae at zero hours of work can be described by the 
following:
(B1) G'a = minimum{[PAYSTD - uN ], [AFDCMAX]}, 
where PAYSTD is the state’s monthly payment standard, rA is the state’s tax on unearned 
income and AFDCMAX is the state’s maximum allowable benefit (Graham and Beller, p. 
683). For each state, PAYSTD and AFDCMAX increase as family size increases but rA 
does not. The sources for the state-level AFDC maximum benefit and payment standards 
are Tables 6 and 7 (pp. 299-301) from the 1984 Green Book of the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means. The source for state-level information 
on unearned income tax rates is the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
(1985).
The AFDC tax rate on earnings, tA, follows a particular pattern regardless of the 
state. If the mother has worked continuously for four months or less, tA = 0.67. If she 
has worked more than four months, tA = 1. Fortunately, the SIPP data allow us to check 
how many months each mother worked up to the week of the interview, so, tA takes the 
value of 0.67 or 1, depending upon her recent work history.
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APPENDIX C
Calculation of FSP Benefits
Appendix C
FSP Benefit Calculations
The full complex FSP benefit calculation regime is ably described by Fraker and 
Moffitt (p.27) as:
(C1) Bf = max [M, Gf -  r*Yn], if Yn < Y* and wH + N < 1.3Y*,
= 0, if Yn > Y* or wH + N > 1.3Y*,
(C2) Yn = max [0, wH + N -  (eFwH+ Df + SF)],
(C3) S = min [Scap, max (0, R -  tsYm)],
(C4) Ym = max [0, wH + N -  (eFwH + Df)],
where Bf is the Food Stamp benefit, M is the minimum benefit, GF is the guarantee if the 
household has no other resources, rF is the FSP tax on income (earned or unearned), Yn is 
net Food Stamp income, Y* is the poverty line, w is the wage, H is hours of work, N is 
other household income (unearned), eF is the earned income disregard, Df is the standard 
deduction, SF is the shelter deduction, Scap is the cap on the value of the shelter deduction, 
tS is the shelter deduction tax on the program’s intermediate net income, Ym.
The actual steps for determining FSP benefits starts with (C4), calculating 
intermediate net income for the purposes of setting the shelter deduction in (C3). That, in 
turn is used in (C2) to calculate food stamp net income, Yn. The value of Yn is then 
compared to the poverty line. If food stamp net income (Yn) is greater than the poverty 
line or if  gross income (wH + N) is greater than 130 percent of the poverty line as in 
(C1), the household is not eligible for food stamps and the benefit is zero. If both income 
values are less than their respective proportions of the poverty line, then, the benefit is
C1
calculated as in (C1). Note that if the household is eligible, though barely so, they will 
receive the minimum benefit (M).
As mentioned in the discussion of our theoretical framework in section III, we 
simplify the benefit calculation for a practical reason, rent or mortgage data are not 
available. We, therefore, assume the shelter deduction is fixed at the maximum (Scap). In 
1984, the shelter deduction caps were $218, $180 and $125 in Alaska, Hawaii and all 
other states, respectively. Similarly, the standard deduction (DF) was $89 in all states 
except Alaska ($152) and Hawaii ($126). The values of rF, eF and tS were 0.3, 0.18, and 
0.5, respectively. The source for this information is page 631 of the 1984 Green Book of 
the U.S. Hours of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means.
For our FSP program participation and hours equations, the variables of interest 
are the single mother’s guarantee at zero hours of work given her unearned income, G'F, 
the tax rate on unearned income, rF, and the tax on earnings tF. These variables are set or 
calculated for each household as follows: 
rF, =0.3,
tF = rF(1 - eF) = 0.3(1 -  0.18) = 0.246 and 
G'f = Gf -  rF(N - Df - Sf) = Gf -  0.3(N - $224), 
for all states except Alaska and Hawaii where the standard deduction and shelter 
deduction caps are higher as indicated above. As in (C1), the minimum benefit replaces 
the calculated G'f if  the household is net and gross income eligible and the calculated 
benefit would be lower than the minimum.
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APPENDIX D
Wage Estimation Results from Heckman’s Two-Step Sample 
Selection Correction Procedure for
Rural, Suburban and Urban Single Parents
Table D1: Rural Model: Wage Model, Estimated Using Heckman's
Two-Step Method to Correct for Sample Selection Bias
Step One: Probit Model of Labor Participation
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -1.2331 1.0297 -1.1980 0.2311
ED 0.1010 0.0352 2.8710 0.0041 11.3145
AGE 0.0324 0.0416 0.7780 0.4366 37.0920
AGESQ -0.0005 0.0005 -1.0020 0.3163 1521.9585
BLACK 0.0666 0.2335 0.2850 0.7756 0.2433
UNRATE -0.0512 0.0342 -1.4970 0.1345 8.1448
MIDWEST 0.1137 0.2473 0.4600 0.6456 0.2760
NOREAST 0.2756 0.2981 0.9240 0.3553 0.1306
SOUTH 0.3011 0.2552 1.1800 0.2381 0.4481
KIDS05 -0.3057 0.1125 -2.7180 0.0066 0.6113
KIDS610 -0.0662 0.1070 -0.6190 0.5357 0.5015
KIDS1117 -0.0262 0.0904 -0.2900 0.7721 0.9110
UNEARNED -0.0005 0.0002 -2.4470 0.0144 303.7656
SEP 0.1561 0.2813 0.5550 0.5790 0.1958
DIV 0.4305 0.2455 1.7540 0.0795 0.5104
NEVERMAR -0.3203 0.3369 -0.9510 0.3418 0.1157
NADULTS 0.1205 0.1022 1.1780 0.2387 1.4985
DISABLED -1.1411 0.2342 -4.8730 0.0000 0.1424
TENURE 0.4980 0.1800 2.7670 0.0057 0.4243
Observations= 337
Log Likelihood= -
185.7084
Log Likelihood0= -
229.4056
Step Two: Sample Selection Model (Two Stage Least Squares Estimates)
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant 1.2887 0.5664 2.2750 0.0229
ED 0.0472 0.0199 2.3690 0.0178 11.9333
AGE 0.0067 0.0204 0.3270 0.7440 36.2256
AGESQ 0.0000 0.0002 -0.1880 0.8506 1418.2256
BLACK 0.0238 0.1119 0.2130 0.8314 0.2154
UNRATE 0.0081 0.0173 0.4690 0.6394 8.0179
MIDWEST -0.2638 0.1320 -1.9990 0.0456 0.2821
NOREAST -0.3795 0.1512 -2.5090 0.0121 0.1487
SOUTH -0.4125 0.1414 -2.9170 0.0035 0.4359
LAMBDA -0.3751 0.1423 -2.6350 0.0084 0.5395
Observations= 195
Log Likelihood= -
138.0060
Log Likelihood0 = -
164.0347
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Table D2: Suburban Model: Wage Model, Estimated Using
Heckman's Two-Step Method to Correct for Sample
Selection Bias
Step One: Probit Model of Labor Participation
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -2.5250 0.9176 -2.7520 0.0059
ED 0.1173 0.0265 4.4190 0.0000 11.7900
AGE 0.1404 0.0422 3.3250 0.0009 37.8593
AGESQ -0.0018 0.0005 -3.5860 0.0003 1556.1175
BLACK 0.0194 0.1803 0.1080 0.9143 0.2139
UNRATE -0.0915 0.0381 -2.3980 0.0165 7.7129
ORACE -0.0848 0.3629 -0.2340 0.8152 0.0385
MIDWEST -0.0875 0.2047 -0.4280 0.6689 0.2408
NOREAST -0.0303 0.2060 -0.1470 0.8830 0.2331
SOUTH 0.0452 0.1938 0.2330 0.8154 0.3121
KIDS05 -0.3010 0.1033 -2.9140 0.0036 0.4875
KIDS610 -0.2326 0.0932 -2.4950 0.0126 0.4894
KIDS1117 -0.1145 0.0824 -1.3900 0.1645 1.0019
UNEARNED -0.0005 0.0001 -4.0020 0.0001 486.2601
SEP -0.0818 0.2366 -0.3460 0.7294 0.2023
DIV 0.1773 0.2079 0.8530 0.3938 0.4894
NEVERMAR -0.2648 0.2719 -0.9740 0.3301 0.1426
NADULTS 0.1074 0.0867 1.2390 0.2155 1.5376
DISABLED -1.3768 0.2160 -6.3740 0.0000 0.1175
TENURE 0.5702 0.1614 3.5330 0.0004 0.4971
Observations= 519
Log Likelihood= -243.7698
Log Likelihood0= -340.3474
Step Two: Sample Selection Model (Two Stage Least Squares Estimates)
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant 0.6521 0.4813 1.3550 0.1754
ED 0.0615 0.0125 4.9100 0.0000 12.5879
AGE 0.0369 0.0205 1.8010 0.0717 37.2697
AGESQ -0.0004 0.0002 -1.7970 0.0723 1466.8758
BLACK -0.0424 0.0729 -0.5810 0.5610 0.1879
UNRATE -0.0191 0.0158 -1.2110 0.2258 7.5758
ORACE -0.0712 0.1426 -0.4990 0.6179 0.0364
MIDWEST -0.1001 0.0795 -1.2590 0.2081 0.2303
NOREAST -0.1800 0.0790 -2.2780 0.0227 0.2333
SOUTH -0.2584 0.0764 -3.3820 0.0007 0.3152
LAMBDA -0.1375 0.1067 -1.2890 0.1974 0.4139
Observations= 330
Log Likelihood= -209.5530
Log Likelihood0 = -252.3513
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Table D3: Urban Model: Wage Model, Estimated Using Heckman's
Two-Step Method to Correct for Sample Selection Bias
Step One: Probit Model of Labor Participation
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -3.2764 0.8700 -3.7660 0.0002
ED 0.0517 0.0213 2.4220 0.0154 11.2981
AGE 0.1903 0.0402 4.7350 0.0000 36.5947
AGESQ -0.0024 0.0005 -4.9700 0.0000 1482.6568
BLACK 0.0882 0.1318 0.6690 0.5033 0.4891
UNRATE -0.0884 0.0355 -2.4880 0.0128 7.4497
ORACE 0.8856 0.5225 1.6950 0.0901 0.0155
MIDWEST -0.2845 0.1844 -1.5430 0.1228 0.2717
NOREAST -0.4220 0.1922 -2.1950 0.0281 0.2158
SOUTH 0.1194 0.1805 0.6610 0.5084 0.3494
KIDS05 -0.3627 0.0846 -4.2860 0.0000 0.6506
KIDS610 -0.3193 0.0858 -3.7230 0.0002 0.5342
KIDS1117 -0.1972 0.0650 -3.0330 0.0024 0.9208
UNEARNED -0.0001 0.0001 -0.7170 0.4732 258.4612
SEP 0.2490 0.2140 1.1640 0.2446 0.2469
DIV 0.4827 0.2058 2.3460 0.0190 0.3354
NEVERMAR 0.0512 0.2278 0.2250 0.8221 0.2717
NADULTS 0.1944 0.0735 2.6440 0.0082 1.5497
DISABLED -0.9940 0.1826 -5.4430 0.0000 0.1398
TENURE 0.5139 0.1520 3.3800 0.0007 0.2717
Observations= 644
Log Likelihood= -329.4686
Log Likelihood0 = -446.3837
Step Two: Sample Selection Model (Two Stage Least Squares Estimates)
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of 
X
Constant 0.0234 0.5619 0.0420 0.9668
ED 0.0447 0.0100 4.4510 0.0000 11.9377
AGE 0.0441 0.0260 1.6970 0.0897 36.6262
AGESQ -0.0006 0.0003 -1.7890 0.0736 1420.981
O
BLACK 0.1139 0.0612 1.8620 0.0627 0.4704
UNRATE 0.0569 0.0172 3.3130 0.0009 7.2103
ORACE -0.2630 0.1936 -1.3580 0.1743 0.0218
MIDWEST -0.0485 0.0907 -0.5350 0.5928 0.2243
NOREAST 0.0442 0.0971 0.4550 0.6490 0.1838
SOUTH -0.1488 0.0828 -1.7960 0.0724 0.4081
LAMBDA 
Observations = 
Log Likelihood= 
Log Likelihood0 =
-0.1262
321
-219.1280
-253.9321
0.0960 -1.3140 0.1887 0.5788
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APPENDIX E
AFDC and FSP Participation Bivariate Probit Results 
and Labor Supply Regression Results for 
Rural, Suburban and Urban Single Mothers
Table E1: Rural Model Bivariate Probit Participation Estimates
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
AFDC Participation Equation 
CONSTANT 3.0676 1.7468 1.7560 0.0791
GPRIMEAN -0.7872 1.7086 -0.4610 0.6450 0.1562
UNEARNN -3.1659 0.9627 -3.2880 0.0010 0.3038
NEGWTSA 6.2186 1.6611 3.7440 0.0002 -0.5055
KIDS05N 6.9012 2.1322 3.2370 0.0012 0.0611
KIDS610N 2.1124 1.8504 1.1420 0.2536 0.0501
KIDS17N 4.1529 1.8984 2.1880 0.0287 0.0911
NADULTSN 3.7171 1.6530 2.2490 0.0245 0.1499
DIV -0.2896 0.4771 -0.6070 0.5439 0.5104
SEP 0.1732 0.4965 0.3490 0.7272 0.1958
NEVERMAR 0.7818 0.6218 1.2570 0.2086 0.1157
BLACK -0.0664 0.3911 -0.1700 0.8652 0.2433
MIDWEST -0.8252 0.4952 -1.6660 0.0956 0.2760
NOREAST -1.5701 0.5261 -2.9850 0.0028 0.1306
SOUTH -2.4300 0.6943 -3.5000 0.0005 0.4481
TENURE -0.6732 0.4122 -1.6330 0.1024 0.4243
UNRATEN 0.9873 0.6589 1.4980 0.1341 0.8145
DISABLED 0.9122 0.4005 2.2780 0.0227 0.1424
EDN -3.5929 10.4523 -0.3440 0.7310 0.1131
AGEN -1.1611 1.6904 -0.6870 0.4922 0.3709
Food Stamp Program Participation 
CONSTANT 3.2844 4.2059 0.7810 0.4349
GPRIMEFN 2.2304 3.2728 0.6810 0.4956 0.1724
UNEARNN -0.3975 0.7376 -0.5390 0.5900 -0.3038
NEGWTSF 26.9784 39.8451 0.6770 0.4984 -0.1466
KIDS05N 3.0604 2.0071 1.5250 0.1273 0.0611
KIDS610N 2.3562 1.7040 1.3830 0.1668 0.0501
KIDS17N 1.2525 1.7732 0.7060 0.4799 0.0911
NADULTSN -0.9893 2.0453 -0.4840 0.6286 0.1499
DIV 0.1438 0.2987 0.4810 0.6302 0.5104
SEP 0.2737 0.3477 0.7870 0.4312 0.1958
NEVERMAR 0.3677 0.3732 0.9850 0.3245 0.1157
BLACK 0.3112 0.2758 1.1280 0.2592 0.2433
MIDWEST -1.4586 1.8793 -0.7760 0.4377 0.2760
NOREAST -1.5238 2.5126 -0.6060 0.5442 0.1306
SOUTH -2.1641 2.6579 -0.8140 0.4155 0.4481
TENURE -0.4018 0.1894 -2.1210 0.0339 0.4243
UNRATEN 0.6507 0.5599 1.1620 0.2452 0.8145
DISABLED 0.9458 0.2721 3.4760 0.0005 0.1424
EDN 3.7039 25.3492 0.1460 0.8838 0.1131
AGEN 0.8918 1.8193 0.4900 0.6240 0.3709
Disturbance Correlation
RHO(1,2) 0.5987 0.1513 3.9570 0.0001
Observations= 337
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Table E2: Rural Model Total Hours Least Squares Estimates
Avg. Total Hours Worked: 22.3917
Variable Coef. S.E.
Constant 0.5976 7.8140
KIDS05 2.4120 1.6286
KIDS610 1.9793 1.4478
KIDS1117 4.2938 1.2363
NADULTS 2.4040 1.2174
BLACK -1.8064 2.8296
DIV 4.8777 2.7306
SEP 2.8839 3.1648
NEVERMAR 2.8967 3.9299
MIDWEST 7.3901 3.1917
NOREAST 7.8235 3.7244
SOUTH 6.6104 3.5374
DISABLED -7.2536 3.0034
UNRATE -0.6887 0.4071
NETWAGE 4.1077 0.7901
GAP -0.0321 0.0126
GFDPP -0.0107 0.0201
UNEARNED -0.0160 0.0030
?AA 10.7430 2.4348
I ff -0.9092 2.2285
Observations= 337.0000
R2= 0.4299
t-stat. p-level Mean of X Elasticity
0.0760 0.9391
1.4810 0.1396 0.6113 0.0658
1.3670 0.1726 0.5015 0.0443
3.4730 0.0006 0.9110 0.1747
1.9750 0.0492 1.4985 0.1609
-0.6380 0.5237 0.2433 -0.0196
1.7860 0.0750 0.5104 0.1112
0.9110 0.3628 0.1958 0.0252
0.7370 0.4616 0.1157 0.0150
2.3150 0.0212 0.2760 0.0911
2.1010 0.0365 0.1306 0.0456
1.8690 0.0626 0.4481 0.1323
-2.4150 0.0163 0.1424 -0.0461
-1.6920 0.0917 8.1448 -0.2505
5.1990 0.0000 4.2129 0.7729
-2.5500 0.0112 66.9644 -0.0961
-0.5310 0.5960 75.2582 -0.0358
-5.4030 0.0000 303.7656 -0.2175
4.4120 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-0.4080 0.6836 0.0000 0.0000
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Table E3: Suburban Model Bivariate Probit Participation Estimates
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
AFDC Participation Equation 
CONSTANT 0.8861 1.0916 0.8120 0.4169
GPRIMEAN 2.0783 0.9342 2.2250 0.0261 0.1745
UNEARNN -0.9592 0.3524 -2.7220 0.0065 0.4863
NEGWTSA 5.7664 1.2910 4.4670 0.0000 -0.5324
KIDS05N 4.0692 1.8678 2.1790 0.0294 0.0487
KIDS610N 0.7616 1.8302 0.4160 0.6773 0.0489
KIDS17N 1.6767 1.5263 1.0990 0.2719 0.1002
NADULTSN 2.2059 1.2115 1.8210 0.0686 0.1538
DIV 0.3117 0.3987 0.7820 0.4343 0.4894
SEP 0.6671 0.4107 1.6250 0.1043 0.2023
NEVERMAR 0.3436 0.4633 0.7420 0.4582 0.1426
BLACK -0.2506 0.3304 -0.7580 0.4482 0.2139
ORACE 0.0535 1.7370 0.0310 0.9754 0.0385
MIDWEST -0.7189 0.3239 -2.2190 0.0265 0.2408
NOREAST -1.6503 0.4643 -3.5540 0.0004 0.2331
SOUTH -1.3603 0.4637 -2.9340 0.0034 0.3121
TENURE -0.7670 0.3085 -2.4860 0.0129 0.4971
UNRATEN -0.4299 0.7911 -0.5430 0.5868 0.7713
DISABLED 0.7822 0.3156 2.4790 0.0132 0.1175
EDN 10.3792 5.6020 1.8530 0.0639 0.1179
AGEN -0.0153 1.3131 -0.0120 0.9907 0.3786
Food Stamp Participation Equation 
CONSTANT 3.3653 1.1839 2.8430 0.0045
GPRIMEFN 2.3636 3.4011 0.6950 0.4871 0.1458
UNEARNN -0.5709 0.7366 -0.7750 0.4383 0.4863
NEGWTSF 35.0379 9.6162 3.6440 0.0003 -0.1485
KIDS05N 2.2829 2.0674 1.1040 0.2695 0.0487
KIDS610N 2.4749 1.7376 1.4240 0.1544 0.0489
KIDS17N 2.7934 1.7747 1.5740 0.1155 0.1002
NADULTSN -2.6241 2.1264 -1.2340 0.2172 0.1538
DIV 0.3675 0.3756 0.9790 0.3278 0.4894
SEP 0.5521 0.3716 1.4860 0.1373 0.2023
NEVERMAR 0.6932 0.4086 1.6970 0.0898 0.1426
BLACK -0.2994 0.2239 -1.3370 0.1813 0.2139
ORACE -0.5402 0.7883 -0.6850 0.4931 0.0385
MIDWEST -0.5154 0.2891 -1.7820 0.0747 0.2408
NOREAST -0.9507 0.3576 -2.6590 0.0078 0.2331
SOUTH -1.4563 0.4389 -3.3180 0.0009 0.3121
TENURE -0.7778 0.2158 -3.6040 0.0003 0.4971
UNRATEN -0.2548 0.5098 -0.5000 0.6172 0.7713
DISABLED 0.7854 0.2512 3.1260 0.0018 0.1175
EDN 14.0852 7.8144 1.8020 0.0715 0.1179
AGEN -0.2165 1.0814 -0.2000 0.8413 0.3786
Disturbance Correlation 
RHO(1,2) 0.8151 0.0831 9.8090 0.0000
Observations= 519
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Table E4: Suburban Model Total Hours Least Squares Estimates
Avg. Total Hours Worked: 22.3917
Variable Coef. S.E.
Constant 9.4308 5.5992
KIDS05 -1.0896 1.2641
KIDS610 -1.2091 1.1033
KIDS1117 -0.2634 0.9749
NADULTS 1.3188 0.8389
BLACK -0.2992 1.9684
ORACE 5.7327 3.8310
DIV 8.5506 2.0934
SEP 6.6275 2.4798
NEVERMAR 4.1019 2.8228
MIDWEST 0.6110 2.1874
NOREAST -2.4651 2.2227
SOUTH 2.0103 2.2463
DISABLED -10.9377 2.3528
UNRATE -0.5483 0.4120
NETWAGE 3.8075 0.5305
GAP -0.0143 0.0076
GFDPP 0.0116 0.0163
UNEARNED -0.0078 0.0014
?AA 7.9836 1.8328
1Ff -2.5662 1.7140
Observations= 519
r 2= 0.4305
t-stat. p-level Mean of X Elasticity
1.6840 0.0921
-0.8620 0.3887 0.4875 -0.0237
-1.0960 0.2731 0.4894 -0.0264
-0.2700 0.7870 1.0019 -0.0118
1.5720 0.1160 1.5376 0.0906
-0.1520 0.8792 0.2139 -0.0029
1.4960 0.1346 0.0385 0.0099
4.0850 0.0000 0.4894 0.1869
2.6730 0.0075 0.2023 0.0599
1.4530 0.1462 0.1426 0.0261
0.2790 0.7800 0.2408 0.0066
-1.1090 0.2674 0.2331 -0.0257
0.8950 0.3708 0.3121 0.0280
-4.6490 0.0000 0.1175 -0.0574
-1.3310 0.1832 7.7129 -0.1889
7.1780 0.0000 4.8028 0.8167
-1.8830 0.0596 74.0597 -0.0474
0.7100 0.4774 37.9788 0.0197
-5.7770 0.0000 486.2601 -0.1701
4.3560 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
-1.4970 0.1343 0.0000 0.0000
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Table E5: Urban Model Bivariate Probit Participation Estimates
Variable Coef. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
AFDC Participation Equation 
Constant -1.0204 0.7773 -1.3130 0.1893
GPRIMEAN 2.1794 0.6990 3.1180 0.0018 0.2397
UNEARNN -1.4737 0.5431 -2.7140 0.0067 0.2585
NEGWTSA 5.2193 0.9734 5.3620 0.0000 -0.4724
KIDS05N 3.7959 0.8713 4.3570 0.0000 0.0651
KIDS610N 2.6200 1.2119 2.1620 0.0306 0.0534
KIDS17N 0.8303 0.8473 0.9800 0.3271 0.0921
NADULTSN 1.7372 0.9867 1.7610 0.0783 0.1550
DIV 0.4472 0.2969 1.5060 0.1320 0.3354
SEP 0.2568 0.2918 0.8800 0.3789 0.2469
NEVERMAR 0.5477 0.2954 1.8540 0.0637 0.2717
BLACK 0.5698 0.1846 3.0870 0.0020 0.4891
ORACE -1.7049 1.0402 -1.6390 0.1012 0.0155
MIDWEST 0.3098 0.2852 1.0860 0.2775 0.2717
NOREAST -0.3085 0.2822 -1.0930 0.2743 0.2158
SOUTH -0.2845 0.3145 -0.9050 0.3657 0.3494
TENURE -0.6348 0.2069 -3.0690 0.0022 0.2717
UNRATEN 0.9831 0.4639 2.1190 0.0341 0.7450
DISABLED 0.4350 0.2374 1.8320 0.0669 0.1398
EDN 6.7339 3.7639 1.7890 0.0736 0.1130
AGEN -0.0156 0.9304 -0.0170 0.9867 0.3659
Food Stamp Participation Equation 
Constant 0.0124 0.5958 0.0210 0.9834
GPRIMEFN 2.8058 2.1717 1.2920 0.1964 0.1902
UNEARNN -0.4452 0.3983 -1.1180 0.2636 0.2585
NEGWTSF 10.0929 5.9128 1.7070 0.0878 -0.1408
KIDS05N 3.8131 1.4052 2.7140 0.0067 0.0651
KIDS610N 2.2556 1.3387 1.6850 0.0920 0.0534
KIDS17N 0.7891 1.1789 0.6690 0.5033 0.0921
NADULTSN -1.4763 1.3686 -1.0790 0.2807 0.1550
DIV 0.0645 0.2296 0.2810 0.7787 0.3354
SEP 0.0865 0.2361 0.3660 0.7140 0.2469
NEVERMAR 0.4626 0.2467 1.8750 0.0608 0.2717
BLACK 0.3559 0.1778 2.0020 0.0453 0.4891
ORACE -1.0045 0.6579 -1.5270 0.1268 0.0155
MIDWEST 0.4651 0.2102 2.2130 0.0269 0.2717
NOREAST 0.6251 0.2201 2.8400 0.0045 0.2158
SOUTH -0.1873 0.2319 -0.8070 0.4194 0.3494
TENURE -0.5550 0.1594 -3.4830 0.0005 0.2717
UNRATEN 1.0495 0.5721 1.8340 0.0666 0.7450
DISABLED 0.4342 0.1875 2.3150 0.0206 0.1398
EDN -2.4800 4.5156 -0.5490 0.5829 0.1130
AGEN -0.8748 0.8570 -1.0210 0.3073 0.3659
Disturbance Correlation 
RHO(1,2) 0.7868 0.0498 15.8110 0.0000
Observations= 644
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Table E6: Urban Model Total Hours Least Squares Estimates
Avg. Total Hours Worked: 19.1413
Variable Coef. S.E.
Constant 9.9509 3.9675
KIDS05 -1.6281 1.0032
KIDS610 -1.1799 0.9896
KIDS1117 0.1745 0.7446
NADULTS 3.2113 0.6837
BLACK 0.2994 1.2810
ORACE 13.3497 4.6244
DIV 9.7297 1.9120
SEP 5.2055 1.9890
NEVERMAR 5.8634 2.0590
MIDWEST -0.8310 1.8600
NOREAST -6.8663 1.8899
SOUTH 1.5008 1.8428
DISABLED -7.6815 1.7097
UNRATE -1.8879 0.3567
NETWAGE 4.5180 0.5000
GAP -0.0015 0.0053
GFDPP 0.0139 0.0121
UNEARNED -0.0057 0.0015
?AA 3.0040 1.4346
I ff -4.6800 1.3703
Observations= 644
r 2= 0.5328
t-stat. p-level Mean of X Elasticity
2.5080 0.0121
-1.6230 0.1046 0.6506 -0.0553
-1.1920 0.2331 0.5342 -0.0329
0.2340 0.8147 0.9208 0.0084
4.6970 0.0000 1.5497 0.2600
0.2340 0.8152 0.4891 0.0077
2.8870 0.0039 0.0155 0.0108
5.0890 0.0000 0.3354 0.1705
2.6170 0.0089 0.2469 0.0671
2.8480 0.0044 0.2717 0.0832
-0.4470 0.6550 0.2717 -0.0118
-3.6330 0.0003 0.2158 -0.0774
0.8140 0.4154 0.3494 0.0274
-4.4930 0.0000 0.1398 -0.0561
-5.2920 0.0000 7.4497 -0.7348
9.0360 0.0000 3.5946 0.8484
-0.2730 0.7845 126.9115 -0.0096
1.1510 0.2495 70.3773 0.0510
-3.7050 0.0002 258.4612 -0.0765
2.0940 0.0363 0.0000 0.0000
-3.4150 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000
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APPENDIX F
Marginal Effects for Bivariate Probit 
Conditional Mean Functions for
Rural, Suburban and Urban Households
Table F1: Rural Model Marginal Effects for Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(APART|FPART=1)
Avg. Prob = 0.154282
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
CONSTANT 0.4982 0.6880 0.7240 0.4690
GPRIMEA -0.2105 0.4323 -0.4870 0.6263 0.1562
UNEARN -0.8078 0.2539 -3.1810 0.0015 0.3038
NEGWTSA 1.6633 0.4664 3.5670 0.0004 -0.5055
KIDS05 1.5456 0.5000 3.0910 0.0020 0.0611
KIDS610 0.3338 0.5053 0.6610 0.5089 0.0501
KIDS17 0.9879 0.5347 1.8480 0.0646 0.0911
NADULTS 1.0913 0.4718 2.3130 0.0207 0.1499
DIV -0.0916 0.1236 -0.7410 0.4589 0.5104
SEP 0.0195 0.1264 0.1540 0.8775 0.1958
NEVERMAR 0.1730 0.1615 1.0720 0.2839 0.1157
BLACK -0.0483 0.1007 -0.4800 0.6315 0.2433
MIDWEST -0.0776 0.2360 -0.3290 0.7423 0.2760
NOREAST -0.2704 0.2901 -0.9320 0.3512 0.1306
SOUTH -0.4376 0.3006 -1.4560 0.1454 0.4481
TENURE -0.1406 0.0981 -1.4330 0.1518 0.4243
UNRATE 0.2002 0.1552 1.2900 0.1972 0.8145
DISABLED 0.1512 0.1033 1.4630 0.1434 0.1424
EDN -1.3244 3.1563 -0.4200 0.6748 0.1131
AGEN -0.3981 0.4715 -0.8440 0.3985 0.3709
GPRIMEF -0.2189 0.3386 -0.6460 0.5181 0.1724
NEGWTSF -2.6472 4.1103 -0.6440 0.5195 -0.1466
F1
Table F2: Rural Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(FPART|APART=1)
Avg. Prob = 0.864472
Variable Marg. S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Effect
CONSTANT 0.4408 1.2293 0.3590 0.7199
GPRIMEF 0.5881 0.8933 0.6580 0.5103 0.1724
UNEARN 0.3341 0.2201 1.5180 0.1291 0.3038
NEGWTSF 7.1140 11.0518 0.6440 0.5198 -0.1466
KIDS05 -0.1497 0.6114 -0.2450 0.8066 0.0611
KIDS610 0.3285 0.5459 0.6020 0.5474 0.0501
KIDS17 -0.2454 0.5156 -0.4760 0.6341 0.0911
NADULTS -0.7762 0.5383 -1.4420 0.1494 0.1499
DIV 0.0781 0.0848 0.9210 0.3571 0.5104
SEP 0.0482 0.0966 0.4980 0.6182 0.1958
NEVERMAR -0.0114 0.1108 -0.1030 0.9179 0.1157
BLACK 0.0912 0.0941 0.9690 0.3324 0.2433
MIDWEST -0.2702 0.5288 -0.5110 0.6093 0.2760
NOREAST -0.1842 0.6787 -0.2710 0.7861 0.1306
SOUTH -0.2338 0.7256 -0.3220 0.7473 0.4481
TENURE -0.0126 0.0740 -0.1710 0.8646 0.4243
UNRATE 0.0347 0.1503 0.2310 0.8174 0.8145
DISABLED 0.1230 0.1243 0.9900 0.3224 0.1424
ED 1.4748 6.3615 0.2320 0.8167 0.1131
AGE 0.3961 0.4683 0.8460 0.3976 0.3709
GPRIMEA 0.1091 0.2349 0.4650 0.6422 0.1562
NEGWTSA -0.8621 0.2984 -2.8890 0.0039 -0.5055
F2
Table F3: Rural Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(APART|FPART=0)
Avg. Prob = 0.017093
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
CONSTANT 0.0810 0.1544 0.5250 0.5996
GPRIMEA -0.0392 0.0846 -0.4640 0.6426 0.1562
UNEARN -0.1491 0.1113 -1.3400 0.1801 0.3038
NEGWTSA 0.3100 0.2559 1.2120 0.2256 -0.5055
KIDS05 0.2771 0.2153 1.2870 0.1981 0.0611
KIDS610 0.0537 0.1139 0.4720 0.6369 0.0501
KIDS17 0.1796 0.1626 1.1050 0.2692 0.0911
NADULTS 0.2070 0.1454 1.4230 0.1547 0.1499
DIV -0.0176 0.0255 -0.6900 0.4901 0.5104
SEP 0.0026 0.0241 0.1100 0.9126 0.1958
NEVERMAR 0.0309 0.0371 0.8340 0.4045 0.1157
BLACK -0.0101 0.0209 -0.4840 0.6281 0.2433
MIDWEST -0.0092 0.0518 -0.1780 0.8588 0.2760
NOREAST -0.0449 0.0763 -0.5890 0.5558 0.1306
SOUTH -0.0738 0.0916 -0.8060 0.4204 0.4481
TENURE -0.0248 0.0276 -0.8970 0.3699 0.4243
UNRATE 0.0350 0.0433 0.8080 0.4189 0.8145
DISABLED 0.0248 0.0286 0.8650 0.3872 0.1424
ED -0.2602 0.5953 -0.4370 0.6620 0.1131
AGE -0.0774 0.0903 -0.8570 0.3915 0.3709
GPRIMEF -0.0488 0.0781 -0.6250 0.5321 0.1724
NEGWTSF -0.5906 0.9189 -0.6430 0.5204 -0.1466
F3
Table F4: Rural Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(FPART|APART=0)
Avg. Prob = 0.3781
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
CONSTANT 1.1212 1.7006 0.6590 0.5097
GPRIMEF 0.8915 1.3132 0.6790 0.4972 0.1724
UNEARN 0.0388 0.3013 0.1290 0.8975 0.3038
NEGWTSF 10.7833 15.8446 0.6810 0.4961 -0.1466
KIDS05 0.7923 0.8048 0.9840 0.3249 0.0611
KIDS610 0.8099 0.6859 1.1810 0.2377 0.0501
KIDS17 0.2413 0.7089 0.3400 0.7335 0.0911
NADULTS -0.6275 0.8074 -0.7770 0.4370 0.1499
DIV 0.0756 0.1110 0.6810 0.4959 0.5104
SEP 0.0986 0.1329 0.7420 0.4583 0.1958
NEVERMAR 0.0982 0.1416 0.6930 0.4881 0.1157
BLACK 0.1285 0.1061 1.2110 0.2260 0.2433
MIDWEST -0.5315 0.7504 -0.7080 0.4788 0.2760
NOREAST -0.5110 1.0017 -0.5100 0.6100 0.1306
SOUTH -0.7132 1.0562 -0.6750 0.4995 0.4481
TENURE -0.1186 0.0769 -1.5410 0.1233 0.4243
UNRATE 0.1984 0.2145 0.9250 0.3550 0.8145
DISABLED 0.3211 0.1073 2.9920 0.0028 0.1424
ED 1.7048 9.9235 0.1720 0.8636 0.1131
AGE 0.4290 0.6959 0.6160 0.5376 0.3709
GPRIMEA 0.0492 0.1001 0.4910 0.6235 0.1562
NEGWTSA -0.3883 0.1311 -2.9620 0.0031 -0.5055
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Table F5: Suburban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate
Probit Conditional Mean Function,
Pr(APART|FPART=1)
Avg. Prob = 0.289912
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -0.6228 0.6744 -0.9240 0.3557
GPRIMEA 1.0231 0.4647 2.2010 0.0277 0.1745
UNEARN -0.2925 0.3338 -0.8760 0.3809 0.4863
NEGWTSA 2.8386 0.7190 3.9480 0.0001 -0.5324
KIDS05 1.2847 1.1397 1.1270 0.2596 0.0487
KIDS610 -0.4039 0.9144 -0.4420 0.6587 0.0489
KIDS17 -0.0537 0.8432 -0.0640 0.9492 0.1002
NADULTS 1.9117 0.8851 2.1600 0.0308 0.1538
DIV 0.0378 0.1560 0.2420 0.8086 0.4894
SEP 0.1547 0.1504 1.0280 0.3039 0.2023
NEVERMAR -0.0490 0.2072 -0.2360 0.8131 0.1426
BLACK -0.0292 0.1510 -0.1930 0.8468 0.2139
ORACE 0.1963 1.0136 0.1940 0.8464 0.0385
MIDWEST -0.1917 0.1597 -1.2000 0.2300 0.2408
NOREAST -0.5132 0.2269 -2.2620 0.0237 0.2331
SOUTH -0.2113 0.2481 -0.8520 0.3943 0.3121
TENURE -0.1328 0.1329 -0.9990 0.3176 0.4971
UNRATE -0.1315 0.4048 -0.3250 0.7454 0.7713
DISABLED 0.1379 0.1332 1.0360 0.3004 0.1175
ED 0.6769 3.4364 0.1970 0.8438 0.1179
AGE 0.0606 0.6324 0.0960 0.9237 0.3786
GPRIMEF -0.7438 1.0870 -0.6840 0.4938 0.1458
NEGWTSF -11.0263 4.5628 -2.4170 0.0157 -0.1485
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Table F6: Suburban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(FPART|APART=1
Avg. Prob = 0.826664
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant 1.1115 0.8039 1.3830 0.1667
GPRIMEF 0.9686 1.2863 0.7530 0.4515 0.1458
UNEARN 0.0557 0.3617 0.1540 0.8777 0.4863
NEGWTSF 14.3580 7.4019 1.9400 0.0524 -0.1485
KIDS05 -0.2931 1.0237 -0.2860 0.7746 0.0487
KIDS610 0.7842 0.9602 0.8170 0.4141 0.0489
KIDS17 0.6385 0.9351 0.6830 0.4947 0.1002
NADULTS -1.7413 0.8817 -1.9750 0.0483 0.1538
DIV 0.0565 0.1250 0.4520 0.6513 0.4894
SEP 0.0248 0.1182 0.2100 0.8337 0.2023
NEVERMAR 0.1803 0.1701 1.0600 0.2890 0.1426
BLACK -0.0470 0.1153 -0.4080 0.6835 0.2139
ORACE -0.2375 0.7618 -0.3120 0.7552 0.0385
MIDWEST 0.0059 0.1393 0.0420 0.9664 0.2408
NOREAST 0.1087 0.1851 0.5870 0.5570 0.2331
SOUTH -0.1861 0.2699 -0.6890 0.4906 0.3121
TENURE -0.0872 0.1221 -0.7140 0.4753 0.4971
UNRATE 0.0254 0.2981 0.0850 0.9321 0.7713
DISABLED 0.0856 0.1250 0.6850 0.4931 0.1175
ED 2.6381 3.8865 0.6790 0.4973 0.1179
AGE -0.0841 0.4935 -0.1700 0.8647 0.3786
GPRIMEA -0.6275 0.3641 -1.7230 0.0849 0.1745
NEGWTSA -1.7410 0.5894 -2.9540 0.0031 -0.5324
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Table F7: Suburban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(APART|FPART=0)
Avg. Prob = 0.989907
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -0.0374 0.0510 -0.7320 0.4641
GPRIMEA 0.0798 0.0735 1.0860 0.2774 0.1745
UNEARN -0.0247 0.0216 -1.1430 0.2531 0.4863
NEGWTSA 0.2214 0.1634 1.3550 0.1753 -0.5324
KIDS05 0.1078 0.1052 1.0250 0.3054 0.0487
KIDS610 -0.0232 0.0708 -0.3280 0.7426 0.0489
KIDS17 0.0051 0.0617 0.0830 0.9336 0.1002
NADULTS 0.1404 0.0914 1.5360 0.1246 0.1538
DIV 0.0042 0.0134 0.3110 0.7557 0.4894
SEP 0.0139 0.0176 0.7890 0.4302 0.2023
NEVERMAR -0.0015 0.0162 -0.0930 0.9260 0.1426
BLACK -0.0033 0.0118 -0.2790 0.7806 0.2139
ORACE 0.0135 0.0792 0.1710 0.8644 0.0385
MIDWEST -0.0167 0.0167 -0.9990 0.3180 0.2408
NOREAST -0.0432 0.0338 -1.2770 0.2016 0.2331
SOUTH -0.0214 0.0255 -0.8370 0.4028 0.3121
TENURE -0.0130 0.0151 -0.8570 0.3916 0.4971
UNRATE -0.0111 0.0327 -0.3400 0.7338 0.7713
DISABLED 0.0134 0.0154 0.8660 0.3863 0.1175
ED 0.0998 0.2683 0.3720 0.7098 0.1179
AGE 0.0040 0.0485 0.0830 0.9342 0.3786
GPRIMEF -0.0501 0.0679 -0.7380 0.4603 0.1458
NEGWTSF -0.7432 0.4938 -1.5050 0.1323 -0.1485
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Table F8: Suburban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(FPART|APART=0)
Avg. Prob = 0.893578
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant 0.6699 0.2425 2.7620 0.0057
GPRIMEF 0.5092 0.7763 0.6560 0.5119 0.1458
UNEARN -0.0633 0.1601 -0.3950 0.6927 0.4863
NEGWTSF 7.5485 2.0896 3.6120 0.0003 -0.1485
KIDS05 0.2386 0.4506 0.5300 0.5965 0.0487
KIDS610 0.4858 0.3272 1.4850 0.1376 0.0489
KIDS17 0.4975 0.3432 1.4500 0.1472 0.1002
NADULTS -0.7026 0.5100 -1.3780 0.1683 0.1538
DIV 0.0598 0.0695 0.8600 0.3898 0.4894
SEP 0.0774 0.0672 1.1530 0.2491 0.2023
NEVERMAR 0.1280 0.0838 1.5280 0.1266 0.1426
BLACK -0.0489 0.0466 -1.0500 0.2939 0.2139
ORACE -0.1197 0.2379 -0.5030 0.6148 0.0385
MIDWEST -0.0663 0.0616 -1.0770 0.2817 0.2408
NOREAST -0.1021 0.0830 -1.2300 0.2186 0.2331
SOUTH -0.2291 0.0975 -2.3500 0.0188 0.3121
TENURE -0.1198 0.0471 -2.5430 0.0110 0.4971
UNRATE -0.0281 0.1153 -0.2440 0.8073 0.7713
DISABLED 0.1205 0.0539 2.2370 0.0253 0.1175
ED 2.3885 1.6659 1.4340 0.1516 0.1179
AGE -0.0457 0.2213 -0.2060 0.8365 0.3786
GPRIMEA -0.1293 0.0564 -2.2950 0.0217 0.1745
NEGWTSA -0.3589 0.1145 -3.1340 0.0017 -0.5324
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Table F9: Urban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(APART|FPART=1)
Avg. Prob = 0.489601
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -0.5414 0.3953 -1.3700 0.1708
GPRIMEA 1.1489 0.3846 2.9870 0.0028 0.2397
UNEARN -0.6505 0.2963 -2.1950 0.0281 0.2585
NEGWTSA 2.7514 0.4547 6.0510 0.0000 -0.4724
KIDS05 0.9188 0.5796 1.5850 0.1129 0.0651
KIDS610 0.7410 0.6915 1.0720 0.2839 0.0534
KIDS17 0.2137 0.5247 0.4070 0.6837 0.0921
NADULTS 1.3348 0.5601 2.3830 0.0172 0.1550
DIV 0.2175 0.1603 1.3570 0.1749 0.3354
SEP 0.1108 0.1597 0.6940 0.4878 0.2469
NEVERMAR 0.1574 0.1561 1.0080 0.3134 0.2717
BLACK 0.1993 0.0970 2.0550 0.0399 0.4891
ORACE -0.6137 0.5495 -1.1170 0.2641 0.0155
MIDWEST 0.0313 0.1537 0.2040 0.8387 0.2717
NOREAST -0.3401 0.1538 -2.2110 0.0270 0.2158
SOUTH -0.0968 0.1700 -0.5700 0.5688 0.3494
TENURE -0.1771 0.0991 -1.7880 0.0738 0.2717
UNRATE 0.2204 0.2680 0.8220 0.4110 0.7450
DISABLED 0.1061 0.1214 0.8740 0.3822 0.1398
ED 4.2537 2.2803 1.8650 0.0621 0.1130
AGE 0.2401 0.5122 0.4690 0.6393 0.3659
GPRIMEF -0.7964 0.6206 -1.2830 0.1994 0.1902
NEGWTSF -2.8646 1.7157 -1.6700 0.0950 -0.1408
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Table F10: Urban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function, Pr(FPART|APART=1)
Avg. Prob = 0.884074
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant 0.1987 0.1943 1.0230 0.3065
GPRIMEF 0.8065 0.6267 1.2870 0.1981 0.1902
UNEARN 0.1539 0.1478 1.0410 0.2979 0.2585
NEGWTSF 2.9010 1.7467 1.6610 0.0967 -0.1408
KIDS05 0.3700 0.4493 0.8240 0.4102 0.0651
KIDS610 0.1473 0.4213 0.3500 0.7267 0.0534
KIDS17 0.0680 0.3575 0.1900 0.8491 0.0921
NADULTS -0.7566 0.3857 -1.9610 0.0498 0.1550
DIV -0.0670 0.0802 -0.8350 0.4035 0.3354
SEP -0.0242 0.0823 -0.2940 0.7685 0.2469
NEVERMAR 0.0282 0.0808 0.3490 0.7267 0.2717
BLACK -0.0067 0.0548 -0.1220 0.9033 0.4891
ORACE 0.0373 0.2515 0.1480 0.8820 0.0155
MIDWEST 0.0744 0.0767 0.9700 0.3319 0.2717
NOREAST 0.2387 0.0868 2.7500 0.0060 0.2158
SOUTH 0.0006 0.0836 0.0070 0.9944 0.3494
TENURE -0.0381 0.0493 -0.7730 0.4395 0.2717
UNRATE 0.1136 0.1669 0.6810 0.4959 0.7450
DISABLED 0.0416 0.0606 0.6870 0.4920 0.1398
ED -2.0007 1.5126 -1.3230 0.1860 0.1130
AGE -0.2485 0.2872 -0.8650 0.3870 0.3659
GPRIMEA -0.4168 0.1477 -2.8210 0.0048 0.2397
NEGWTSA -0.9982 0.2105 -4.7410 0.0000 -0.4724
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Table F11: Urban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function: Pr(APART|FPART=0)
Avg. Prob = 0.950563
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant -0.1495 0.1158 -1.2910 0.1968
GPRIMEA 0.3171 0.1316 2.4100 0.0159 0.2397
UNEARN -0.1752 0.0843 -2.0790 0.0376 0.2585
NEGWTSA 0.7593 0.2125 3.5730 0.0004 -0.4724
KIDS05 0.2162 0.1675 1.2910 0.1967 0.0651
KIDS610 0.1824 0.1970 0.9260 0.3545 0.0534
KIDS17 0.0513 0.1521 0.3370 0.7361 0.0921
NADULTS 0.3828 0.1606 2.3850 0.0171 0.1550
DIV 0.0594 0.0462 1.2840 0.1990 0.3354
SEP 0.0297 0.0453 0.6560 0.5118 0.2469
NEVERMAR 0.0389 0.0453 0.8590 0.3901 0.2717
BLACK 0.0515 0.0286 1.8040 0.0713 0.4891
ORACE -0.1595 0.1556 -1.0250 0.3052 0.0155
MIDWEST 0.0041 0.0430 0.0950 0.9243 0.2717
NOREAST -0.1000 0.0495 -2.0200 0.0434 0.2158
SOUTH -0.0249 0.0482 -0.5160 0.6057 0.3494
TENURE -0.0434 0.0295 -1.4730 0.1407 0.2717
UNRATE 0.0505 0.0805 0.6280 0.5302 0.7450
DISABLED 0.0250 0.0344 0.7280 0.4669 0.1398
ED 1.1982 0.7364 1.6270 0.1037 0.1130
AGE 0.0748 0.1449 0.5160 0.6056 0.3659
GPRIMEF -0.2473 0.1920 -1.2880 0.1979 0.1902
NEGWTSF -0.8895 0.5475 -1.6250 0.1042 -0.1408
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Table F12: Urban Model Marginal Effects for the Bivariate Probit
Conditional Mean Function: Pr(FPART)|APART=0
Avg. Prob = 0.707477
Variable Marg. Effect S.E. t-stat. p-level Mean of X
Constant 0.1911 0.2531 0.7550 0.4502
GPRIMEF 1.1991 0.9315 1.2870 0.1980 0.1902
UNEARN 0.0781 0.1877 0.4160 0.6776 0.2585
NEGWTSF 4.3132 2.5388 1.6990 0.0893 -0.1408
KIDS05 0.9384 0.6123 1.5330 0.1254 0.0651
KIDS610 0.4869 0.5769 0.8440 0.3987 0.0534
KIDS17 0.1861 0.5074 0.3670 0.7139 0.0921
NADULTS -0.9472 0.5685 -1.6660 0.0957 0.1550
DIV -0.0539 0.1045 -0.5150 0.6064 0.3354
SEP -0.0098 0.1077 -0.0910 0.9278 0.2469
NEVERMAR 0.0980 0.1081 0.9070 0.3646 0.2717
BLACK 0.0484 0.0750 0.6450 0.5191 0.4891
ORACE -0.1188 0.3124 -0.3800 0.7036 0.0155
MIDWEST 0.1423 0.0957 1.4880 0.1369 0.2717
NOREAST 0.3233 0.0974 3.3180 0.0009 0.2158
SOUTH -0.0282 0.1079 -0.2620 0.7937 0.3494
TENURE -0.1216 0.0646 -1.8820 0.0598 0.2717
UNRATE 0.2695 0.2413 1.1170 0.2641 0.7450
DISABLED 0.1064 0.0797 1.3340 0.1822 0.1398
ED -2.2859 2.0230 -1.1300 0.2585 0.1130
AGE -0.3710 0.3752 -0.9890 0.3227 0.3659
GPRIMEA -0.3968 0.1489 -2.6660 0.0077 0.2397
NEGWTSA -0.9503 0.1567 -6.0660 0.0000 -0.4724
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